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IINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTS
IN MINNESOTA*
By
G.

ORVILLE C. PETERSONt

THE MINNESOTA CLASSIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS:
EXCEPTIONAL CASES
1.

SEWERS AND

DRAINS

T is firmly established that a municipal corporation is liable

for damages resulting from the negligent maintenance of its
sewer system; but the ground of that liability has not been clearly
stated. Consequently, the problem of classification of the function
of maintaining municipal sewerage is somewhat difficult. The
injuries sustained by the plaintiff in cases involving defective
sewers or drains have been due almost entirely to the maintenance
of a nuisance by the municipality or the invasion of plaintiff's
property by surface water, somewhat similar to a trespass 48
Negligence may or may not be a significant element in the latter
type of tort although it has frequently been treated as a sine qua
non of recovery. 849 In any event, the court never has seemed to
consider the governmental-proprietary test of any significance in
its application to torts resulting from the municipal corporation's
operation of a system of sewers and drains. It is difficult to see
how the function can be viewed as a proprietary one by the
application of any of the rules for determining the governmental
or proprietary nature of a municipal activity. Hence, in so far
as a tort consists of negligence in the maintenance of a sewer
system, the fact that liability attaches suggests that the rule imposing liability should be considered an exception to the applica*Continued from 26 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 358. Views expressed in
this study are the author's and not those of the League of Minnesota Municipalities, with which he is associated.
tAttorney for the League of Minnesota Municipalities, Minneapolis,
Minnesota.
348This type of action is considered in detail later in this study. Infra,
text at footnote 724. Occasionally someone is injured because a defective
sewer causes a hole in the street, but liability attaches in such case because
of negligence in the maintenance of the street, not the sewer. See Baker v.
City of South St. Paul, (1938) 198 Minn. 437, 270 N. W. 154; ef. Piscor v.
Village of Hibbing, (1927) 169 Minn. 478, 211 N. W. 952. The same
rule supplies to an improperly covered water main. Ogren v. City of
Minneapolis, (1913) 121 Minn. 243, 141 N. W. 120.
349
Infra, text at footnotes 687-698.
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tion of the governmental-proprietary test-35* In this respect,
sewers are to be considered in the same category as streets; as a
matter of fact, a municipal corporation in constructing and main-

taining a system for the drainage of surface waters, incident
to the construction of a street, is subject to exactly the same
liability as in the maintenance of its sanitary sewer system.all
In some cases the construction and maintenance of sewers have
been considered merely as part of the construction and mainte3 52
nance of streets.

In Minnesota, as in perhaps all other states, a municipal corporation is given the power to establish and maintain a system
of sewerage, but there is no duty to execute this power. It is
thus a "discretionary" (or, more properly, "optional") power, for

s
failure to carry out which no liability is imposed upon ita
Likewise, since there is no continuing duty to maintain a sewer,
a municipal corporation is not liable for damages resulting from

its abandonment of a sewer or drain if the injured property is
left in no worse condition than it was before the sewer or drain

was constructed.354 The liability of the municipal corporation in
such a case begins only when it assumes to exercise its power
to construct sewers.
It is a rule in general that a municipal corporation is not
liable for any error in judgment on the part of its officers in
deciding upon a particular plan of sewerage resulting in conse-

quential damages to property.

55

The formulation of plans for a

85O0ne early Minnesota case spoke of the duty of constructing sewers
as "a corporate ministerial duty," Simmer v. City of St. Paul, (1877) 23
Minn. 408; but there was no indication from the language that "corporate"
was used in a sense antithetical to "governmental:'
35lIn carrying on the former activity, it does not as often maintain a
nuisance as it does when it discharges sewage on private property, but the
principles of law applicable are the same nevertheless.
352See Welter v. City of St. Paul, (1889) 40 Minn.460, 42 N. 'V. 392.
The syllabus of that case states that where a municipal corporation has
under its charter the care and control of the public streets and has general
authority to make or cause to be made improvements therein, such as
sewers or drains, it is liable for injuries to its employees or others resulting
from 53the negligence of its officers or agents.
3 McClure v. City of Red Wing, (1881) 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. AV. 767;
Henderson v. City of Minneapolis, (1884) 32 Minn. 319. 120 N. W. 322;
Pye v.City of Mankato, (1887) 36 Minn. 373, 31. N. W. 863. This principle
is well established throughout the country. 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. rev. 1936) sec. 2364; Slaymaker, Liability for Injuries Resulting from Defective or Inadequate Sewerage, (1905) 60 Cent. L. J.
224-229.
354Henderson v. City of Minneapolis, (1884) 32 Minn. 319, 120 N. W.
322; O'Neill v. City of St. Paul, (1908) 104 Minn. 491, 116 N. W. 114.
355McClure v. City of Red Wing, (1881) 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. W. 767;
Pye v. City of Mankato, (1887) 36 Minn. 373. 31 N. AV. 863; Tate v. City
of St. Paul, (1894) 56 Minn. 527, 58 N. W. 158, 45 Am. St. Rep. 501.
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sewer improvement involves the exercise of a legislative or discretionary act,350 and immunity is granted in accordance with the
usual principle that there is no liability for damages resulting
from the exercise of a discretionary act.357 As the court said in
one case, 358
"To determine when and upon what plan a public improvement shall be made is, unless the charter otherwise provides, left
to the judgment of the proper municipal authorities, and is, in
its nature, legislative. And, although the power is vested in the
municipality for the benefit and relief of property, error of
judgment as to when or upon what plan the improvement shall be
made, resulting only in incidental injury to the property, will
not be ground of action."
Yet it is questionable how much difference this rule makes in
actual practice. The manner of executing a plan, as distinct from
the making of the plan, is "ministerial," and hence for damages
resulting from the wrongful action of the municipal authorities
in this regard, the municipal corporation is liable."" Furthermore,
no matter how well-justified the plan and how skillfully it is
formulated, a city or village is liable when as a result of carrying
out that plan, surface water or sewage is cast on private property. This, says the court, is a positive invasion of property, a
tort which it will not countenance without redress.300 This is
true even though the direct invasion of property is contemplated
by and necessarily results from the plan adopted. 0 1 Doubtless
the same is true where the damage is considered a nuisance rather
than a trespass. 3 2s Since practically all the cases involving damages from sewer or drain construction have been based on the
maintenance of a nuisance or a positive invasion of private
property in the nature of a trespass, there is in practical effect
no essential difference between damages resulting from defects in
3
5OMcClure v. City of Red Wing, (1881) 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. W. 767;
Tate v. City of St. Paul, (1894)
Rep. 501.
5

38 7See

56 Minn. 527, 58 N. W. 158, 45 Am. St.

(1942) 26 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEw 296-99.

58Tate v. City of St. Paul, (1894) 56 Minn. 527, 58 N. W. 158, 45

Am. St. Rep. 501.
9
35 See McClure v. City of Red Wing, (1881) 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. W.
767.
8 0
6 McClure v. City of Red Wing, (1881) 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. W. 767;

Pye v. City of Mankato, (1887) 36 Minn. 373, 31 N. W. 863. This subject

is treated elsewhere in this study. See infra, text at footnote 685 et seq.
381
Tate v. City of St. Paul, (1894) 56 Minn. 527, 58 N. W. 158, ,45
Am. St. Rep. 501.

362See Tate v. City of St. Paul, (1894) 56 Minn. 527, 58 N. W. 158, 45

Am. St. Rep. 501; Weaver v. Mississippi River & R. R. Boom Co., (1881)

28 Minn. 534, 11 N. W. 114.
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the plan and defects in the execution of the plan or after construction.38 3 As a matter of fact, it is difficult to draw a distinction between the making of a plan and its execution for purposes of tort liability, since the damages do not occur until the
plan is carried out; a property owner suffers no damage from a
blue print.36"
Since there is no obligation on the part of the city or village
to construct sewers, it would seem to follow that there is no liability for damage resulting from insufficient sewers, at least
when the property injured is in no worse a condition than if the
sewer were never constructed-in -other words, if the insufficiency
does not cause a direct invasion of property which would not have
occurred at all if no sewer were constructed. This appears to be
the law. 365 For the same reason, a municipal corporation is not
liable for damages resulting from unusual or unprecedented
storms; it is not an insurer against damage. 3°0
It has been said earlier that practically all cases involving torts
36$Several of the courts have adopted another modification of the rule
that there is no liability for damages resulting from defective plans. In
Indiana and possibly other states, for example, it is held that if there is
actual negligence as distinct from a mere error in judgment, the municipal
corporation is liable. City of North Vernon v. Voegler, (1885) 103 Ind. 314,
2 N. E. 821; City of Birmingham v. Greer, (1930) 220 Ala. 678, 126 So.
859; see also Herring v. District of Columbia, (1882) 2 Mackey (D.C.) 87,
holding that carelessness in selecting the plan is actionable. McQuillin
states that this modification does not seem to be distinctly repudiated in
states which have not expressly adopted it: "It is based on common sense
principles and should be followed." 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations
(2d ed. rev. 1936) sec. 2867, p. 1220. In Wisconsin the doctrine has been
applied where there has not been sufficient care used by the municipality in
adopting the plan to justify believing that any legal discretion was actually
exercised in the matter. Hart v. Neillsville, (1905) 125 Wis. 546, 104 N. V.
699, 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 952. In our own state, a hint of the same qualification of the rule extending immunity for defective plans has been given in
the case of Taubert v. City of St. Paul, (1897) 68 Minn. 519, 71 N. IV.
664, where the court said that there would be no liability if the city "in
the exercise of an honest judgment, constructed a box of such capacity that
they were reasonably justified in believing . . . it would be sufficient to
carry off this water."
36'See David, Municipal Liability for Tortious Acts and Omission
(1936) 61 et seq. See also infra, pp. 531-533 for a discussion of this question in5 street cases.
36 Henderson v. City of Minneapolis, (1884) 32 Minn. 319, 120 N. V.
322; Alden v. City of Minneapolis, (1877) 24 Minn. 254; McClure v. City
of Red Wing, (1881) 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. W. 767; Pye v. City of Mankato,
(1887) 36 Minn. 373, 31 N. W. 863; Taubert v. City of St. Paul, (1897)
68 Minn. 519, 71 N. W. 664; Dudley v. Village of Buffalo, (1898) 73
Minn. 347, 76 N. W. 44. See also 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d
ed rev. 1936) sec. 2868; Slaymaker, Liability for Injuries Resulting from
Defective and Inadequate Sewerage, (1905) 60 Cent. L. J. 224.
366Taubert v. City of St. Paul, (1897) 68 Minn. 519, 71 N. ,V. 664;
Power v. Village of Hibbing, (1930) 182 Minn. 66, 233 N. XV. 597; Hansop
v. City of Montevideo, (1933) 189 Minn. 268, 249 N. V. 46.
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incident to sewer construction concern either nuisance, or an
invasion of property similar to trespass, in neither of which is
negligence always a necessary factor."6 7 At least one case has
arisen in which negligence was directly involved. In Simner v.
8
City of St. Paul,6
the owner of a grocery store brought an
action to recover damages for defendant's alleged negligence in
constructing a sewer, as a result of which access to his premises
was obstructed. The court recognized the principle that "a municipal corporation is liable for damages resulting to a person from
its want of proper care, skill, or diligence in the performance
of a corporate ministerial duty, such as the duty of constructing
sewers," but sustained the defendant's demurrer because the only
damages alleged were gains and profits which might have been
made in the absence of the defendant's negligence, damages so
speculative that they did not aid the plaintiff in stating a cause of
8
action. Similarly in Welter v. City of St. Paid,
"' a municipal
employee was allowed to recover for injuries suffered by a cavein due to negligent bracing of a sewer excavation. The court indicated the city would have been subjected to the same liability if
a third person had been injured.
The question of the necessity for a notice of defects occasionally arises in connection with sewers, though it is a much
more common problem in connection with street defects. 7 0 Apparently the same principles apply. 71 In so far as negligence is
involved, it is essential that the municipal corporation have actual
or constructive notice of the defect where that defect is not its
own creation,
since otherwise there can hardly be said to be
37 2
negligence.
It appears to be an open question whether or not lack of
funds is a defense to an action for damages from negligence in
the maintenance of a sewer. In Netzer v. Crookston City,171 the
defendant assigned as error the refusal of the court to allow it
to prove that the city did not have funds to repair and that it
was in such financial condition that its charter prohibited it from
367But see, infra. text at footnotes 687-698.

$88(1877) 23 Minn. 408.

360(1889) 40 Minn. 460, 42 N. W. 392.

87OSee infra, pp. 518-524. This is not to be confused with the statutory
notice of claim.
8716 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. rev. 1936) sec. 2870.
372Tate v. City of St. Paul, (1894) 56 Minn. 527, 58 N. W. 158; see
Pottner v. City of Minneapolis, (1889) 41 Minn. 73. 42 N. W. 784; Joycc
v. Village of Janesville, (1916) 132 Minn. 121, 155 N. W. 1067.

873(1894) 59 Minn. 244, 61 N. W. 21.
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making any contract incurring a liability for repairing the sewer.
However, the court found it unnecessary to consider the effect
of these facts, if proved, on liability because no such defense
was pleaded 74
2. STmETS AND Sm wAL,S
a. General Rule.--It has'long-been the established rule in this
state that a municipal corpoiifion is under legal obligation to
exercise reasonable care to keep its streets in a safe condition for
public use, and that even though by the usual test of the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions, this duty
is owed to the public, it is liable for damages resulting from its
neglect.8 75 That rule has become so well established as to be
fundamental in our jurisprudence.870 The obligation extends not
only to the street proper but to bridges within municipal limits, 8"
to sidewalkse3 7 and to crosswaks. 379 This subjection to liability
has been stated to follow from defects in all public places,38 0 but
in view of the court's attitude toward such functions as public
parks, this statement must be considered too broad to be accurate.
The rule imposing upon municipal corporations liability for
failure to maintain streets in suitable condition for travel has no
application to counties and towns, which are exempt from liaSo far as their
bility for their negligence in this respect. 81
128 Minn.446. 151 N. W. 143.
of St. Paul v. Kuby, (1863) 8 Minn. 154 (Gil. 125) ; Shartle
v. City of Minneapolis, (1871) 17 Minn. 308 (Gil. 284); Grant v. City
of Brainerd, (1902) 86 Minn. 126, 90 N. W. 307; Bieber v. City of St.
Paul. (1902) 87 Minn. 35, 91 N. W. 20; Sundell v. Village of Tintah,
(1912) 117 Minn. 170, 134 N. W. 639; McGandy v. City of Marshall,
(1929) 178 Minn. 326, 227 N. W. 177; Heidemann v. City of Sleepy Eye,
(1935) 195 Minn. 611, 264 N. W. 212; Callahan v. City of Duluth, (1936)
197 Minn. 403, 267 N. W. 361. The rule has been stated in a number of
otler cases.
37
rMcCarthy v. City of St. Paul, (1937) 201 Minn. 276; 276 N. IV. 1.
The rule has been applied in more than two hundred cases.
377Shartle v. City of Minneapolis, (1871) 17 Minn. 308 (Gil. 284);
Anderson v. City of St. Cloud, (1900) 79 Minn. 88, 81 N. W. 746; Grant
v. City of Brainerd, 1902) 86 Minn. 126, 90 N. W. 307; see Hoppe v. City
(1911) 113 Minn.252, 129 N. W. 577.
of Winona,
B- 8Furnell v. City of St. Paul, (1873) 20 Minn. 117, (Gil. 101); Bohen
v. City of Waseca, (1884) 32 Minn. 176, 19 N. W. 730; Noonan v. City of
Stillwater, (1885) 33 Minn. 198, 22 N. W. 444; Mathieson v. City of
Duluth. (1937) 201 Minn. 290, 276 N. W. 222.
s--Barrett v. City of Virginia, (1929) 179 Minn. 118. 228 N. W. 350.
SSOSundcll v. Village of Tintah. (1912) 117 Minn. 170, 134 N. NV. 639;
Peterson v. Village of Cokato, (1901) 84 Minn. 205, 87 N. W. 615.
388Altnow v. Town of Sibley, (1883) 30 Minn. 186. 14 N. W. 877. See
Nickelsen v. Minneapolis, N. & S. Ry., (1926) 168 Minn. 118, 209 N. '%V.
646. Liability to travelers for damages resulting from defective streets
should not be confused with liability to abutting landowners resulting from
strect construction or maintenance. As has been mentioned, a political sub-

*

Cf.Watson v. City of Duluth, (1915)

375City
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liability is concerned, there is no distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance; 3 2 but that distinction is material in determining the liability of county or town officers. A town officer is
liable for damages resulting from his affirmative misconduct in
repairing a road, 88 although he is not in the case of mere failure
to repair.3 8 ' Doubtless the same is true of the officer of a municipal corporation, since liability does not depend upon the liability
of his superior.38
Recently the court has applied the principle of municipal
responsibility for street defects to the negligence of a street
repair crew. In McCarthy v. City of Ct. Paul,880 a boy had been
injured when a city employee backed a road-blading machine
into him while repairing streets. The city was held liable. The
court said:
"It would be a very tenuous distinction to hold the city to
such liability [for unsafe streets] and free it from liability in
connection with the negligence of its agents in the repair of the
streets which it is3 8 bound
to use reasonable care in maintaining in
T
a safe condition.

Previously the same principle had been applied to an action for
damages to a plaintiff injured through negligent street flushing ;","
but that action had been treated exactly as if it had been for
damages resulting from a defective street, no mention being made
of any possible distinction between liability for street defects
and liability for the negligence of street crews. In the McCarthy
division of the state in control of its roads and streets has the same rights
and powers as a private person over his lands and is subject to the same
liabilities. There is no difference between municipal and quasi municipal
corporations in this field. Peters v. Town of Fergus Falls, (1886) 35 Minn.
549, 29 N. W. 586; O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1878) 25 Minn. 331, 33
Am. 382
R. 470; Dyer v. City of St. Paul, (1881) 27 Minn. 457, 8 N. W. 272.
Weltsch v. Town of Stark, (1896) 65 Minn. 5, 67 N. W. 648.
S3Tholkes v. Decock, (1914) 125 Minn. 507, 147 N. W. 648.
384
Boland v. Gihlstorf, (1916) 134 Minn. 41, 158 N. W. 725; Stevens
v. North
States Motor, Inc., (1925) 161 Minn. 345, 201 N. W. 435.
8
3sSee Tholkes v. Decock, (1914) 125 Minn. 507, 147 N. W. 648.
388(1937) 201 Minn. 276, 276 N. W. 1.
387(1937) 201 Minn. 276, 278, 276 N. W. 1.
388
McLeod v. City of Duluth, (1928) 174 Minn. 184, 218 N. W. 892.
Incidentally, an error occurred in the application of this rule in the first
paragraph of the initial installment of this study, (1942) 26 MINNSOTA
LAw REVIEW 293. The first of four illustrative cases there mentioned to
show the anomalous applications of the doctrine of governmental tort
responsibility was based on McLeod v. City of Duluth. It was intended
to show that a city may be held responsible for negligent operation of a
street flusher but not for that of a street sprinkler; actually, because of
an unfortunate reversal of names given the hypothetical victims, what
was stated was exactly the opposite. A further discussion of the McLeod
Case appears in a subsequent chapter devoted to torts involving mixed
functions.
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Case the court said that it considered the doctrine of the earlier
McLeod Case sound, and that it "would adopt it were the case
at bar one of first impression."
b. Explanation for the Rule of Liability.-There is hardly a
function which is any more "governmental" than street maintenance, so by the usual test of liability for public torts, a municipal
corporation should not be liable for injuries arising out of its
negligence in discharging this function. Assuming the soundness
of the distinction between governmental and proprietary powers,
the exemption from liability of quasi municipal corporations is
logical, the responsibility of cities and villages in such cases is
not.38 9 The difference in liability between the two types of governmental units has not been satisfactorily explained, although
some courts have tried to rationalize their imposition of liability
upon municipal corporations. 3 90 Generally speaking, this has not
been true of the Minnesota court, which has recognized that
liability for defective streets is an exception to the general rule
"which we think the courts would do better to rest either upon
certain special considerations of public policy or upon the doctrine of stare decisis than to attempt to find some strictly legal
principle to justify the distinction.' 3 "
On other occasions the doctrine of liability for defective streets
has been termed anomalous, 302 an exception, 8 3 even "an illogical
exception" to the general rule,30 4 and it is recognized that the duty
to provide streets is a governmental one.30 5
Mostly the imposition of liability has been taken for granted
even in the earliest cases. In only a very few is there any attempt
to explain or justify it. It has been stated that the liability arises
out of the fact that the municipal corporation has the exclusive
control of the streets and has the power to provide the means
3
- SsNew England and a few other states deny all liability unless imposed
by statute, because failure to maintain streets properly is regarded as merely
the neglect of a public duty imposed upon the municipal corporation by law
for the benefit of the public, and from the performance of which the corporation receives no profit or advantage. McQuillin, Reason and Scope of

Municipal Liability for Defective Highways, (1901)
White, Negligence of Municipal Corporations (1920)

53 Cent. L. J. 123;

sec. 199.

3907 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, (2d ed. 1928) sec. 2902; see
cases cited
in the extensive annotation in 20 L. R. A. (N.S.) 513.
3912Snider v. City of St. Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466. 472, 53 N. V. 763.
39Gaare v. Board of County Commissioners of Clay County, (1903)

90 Minn. 530, 97 N. W. 422.

3g3McDevitt
v. City of St Paul, (1896) 66 Minn. 14. 68 N. W. 178.
3 4
9 Lane v. Minnesota State Agricultural Society, (1895) 62 Minn. 175,

64 N. 3W: 382.
99Ackeret v. City of Minneapolis, (1915)

976.

129 Minn. 190, 151 N. IV.
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for the proper performance of the duty of keeping them in safe
condition.3 98 Obviously this is an unsatisfactory reason, since it
applies equally to towns and counties and to municipal parks, as
to which liability is not imposed. Occasionally the rule appears to
be treated as not exceptional. Thus in Hall v. City of Austin,81T
in which the defendant was held liable for injuries resulting from
a defective sidewalk, the court said :3
"In claiming that the city is not liable for the negligence of its
officers such as the street commissioner, counsel for the city fail
to distinguish between cases where the duty rests upon a municipal corporation as such, and those where the duty rests upon it as
an agency of the state in the exercise of police powers in which
the corporation as such has no interest. Police officers in preserving public order, firemen in extinguishing or preventing fires,
health officers in taking measures to preserve the public health,
fall under the latter head, while the duty of keeping public streets
in repair falls under the former head, and the doctrine of respondeat superior applies."
It is true, of course, that a municipal corporation is not exercising
police power in maintaining its streets, but it is acting as the
agency of the state if the ordinary distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is to be observed. That fact has
been emphasized in all the cases in which defects in county or
town roads have been involved. It is much more desirable to
recognize municipal liability for street defects as an exception to
the general rule. 899
c. Streets and Sidewalks to Which Liability Extends.-A city
is not usually bound to improve and make fit for travel all platted
streets within its limits. Yet if an ungraded street is used for
travel, and the city has notice of that fact, it must keep the street
in a "reasonably safe" condition for travel.400 No liability attaches
where a platted street has never been graded or opened for
travel ;401 but when a city has graded or improved any portion of
9OoSchigley v. City of Waseca, (1908) 106 Minn. 94, 118 N. W. 259;
see Peterson v. Village of Cokato, (1901) 84 Minn. 205, 87 N. W. 615.
39T(1898) 73 Minn. 134, 75 N. W. 1121.
398(1898) 73 Minn. 134, 137, 75 N. W. 1121.
399As a matter of fact, Mr. Justice Mitchell, who wrote the opinion in
Hall v. City of Austin, also was the judge who had suggested earlier in
Snider v. City of St. Paul, (1892) 51 Minn. 466, 472, 53 N. W. 763, that
municipal liability for failure to keep streets in repair is best considered
an exception to the general rule. See State ex rel. Wharton v. Babcock.
(1930)

181 Minn. 409, 412, 232 N. W. 718: ".

.

. a change in our laws, if

that could be made, imposing liability on the state and its subdivisions to
the same extent as now imposed on cities and villages for defects in highways, would seem meritorious."

40OMiller v. City of Duluth, (1916) 134 Minn. 418, 159 N. W. 960.
40'Nutting v. City of St. Paul, (1898) 73 Minn. 371, 76 N. W. 61.
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a street for purposes of travel, the duty to keep this portion in
repair and the liability for failure to repair arises. 02 Furthermore,
even if the city abandons a public street, it still may not leave the
abandoned part in the shape of a pitfall or trap to motorists or
pedestrians 0 3
Liability is not affected by the type of materials used in the
construction of the street or sidewalk. Thus, a city has been held
liable for injuries suffered on a gravel walk, since it can make no
possible difference to the public, nor can it affect the rights of
individuals, that the materials more generally used in sidewalk
construction were not used. 0 4 The court pointed out:
"The city authorities so acted in reference to this walk as to
hold it out to the people as a public thoroughfare, and therefore
assumed the duty of keeping it in repair. It was placed in the
street to be used by the public as a part of it, and thereupon,, it
became incumbent upon the corporation permitting it to remain,
and to
be so used to see that it was in a safe condition for such
40 5
use."
On the same principle the court has held a municipality liable
for injuries suffered at a comer where there were sidewalks at
both sides of the crossing but no crosswalks. The court said that
the building of a sidewalk on both sides of the crossing in the
usual location of a sidewalk was an invitation to pedestrians to
cross the street on the line of the sidewalks and imposed on the
village the duty to use reasonable care to maintain the crossing in
40
a safe condition for public travel.
Where public ground is not maintained for public travel and
no invitation is extended to the public to use it for such purpose, a
municipality is not liable for injuries resulting from its use for
0°
travel. Deiznitz v. City of St. Paulinvolved a situation of this
sort. A slough in the Mississippi River had a basin in it which
was used as a public dumping ground for garbage and refuse.
During high water it formed a crust on top of the water, on which
vegetation grew to make it look like surrounding land. There
were paths around it. A ten year old girl left the path and walked
into the crust when the watchman usually there was absent. She
was drowned when the crust broke through. The city was held
not liable. The court pointed out that it did not appear that there
402
Treise v. City of St. Paul, (1887) 36 Minn.526, 32 N. W. 857.
4osOllgaard
v. City of Marshall, (1940) 208 Minn. 384, 294 N. W. 228.
4
04Graham v. City of Albert Lea, (1892) 48 Minn.201, 50 N. W. 1108.
405(1892)
48 Minn. 201, 205, 50 N. W. 1108.
4
0eMoran v. Village of Hibbing, (1928) 173 Minn. 458, 217 N. W. 495.
407(1898) 73 Minn. 385, 76 N. W. 48.
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was any invitation to go upon the crust, the nature of the ground
and the offensive character of the dump indicating it was not
so intended to be used by the public. Consequently the city owed
no duty of protection to the girls in going there as a traveler.408
While a municipality is responsible for the proper maintenance
of all its streets and sidewalks within the corporate limits, the
amount of care required of it may depend on the location of the
street. The standard of care is the same-reasonable care in view
of all the circumstances; but since the circumstances differ, a
municipal corporation may be not required to do at some places
what it must do at others. A highly traveled highway requires a
greater amount of care than one little used.4"" The number of
miles of streets and sidewalks may also be a factor, since in determining whether due care is being used, a city's facility to cope with
the situation will depend upon the number of miles it has to main410
tain.
The requirement that municipal corporations are obliged to
keep their streets safe for travel applies to all streets within their
borders, whether in the settled or platted portion or in the outskirts; but the same diligence is not required in maintaining streets
remote from the settled portion as is necessary in the congested
area of the city.,"" There is no obligation to improve and make
fit for travel the whole width of an outlying street. It is sufficient
if a city improves and keeps in condition a roadway of sufficient
width for the ordinary demands of travel. 412 But whether a street
is improved or in its natural condition, a traveler is entitled to
41
protection from dangerous excavations or pitfalls. 8
So far as concerns the municipality's duty to maintain streets
and sidewalks in safe condition, it is immaterial how the street or
sidewalk became such. The liability is the same whether the street
was acquired by formal official action in accepting its dedication
or by acceptance by user on the part of the public. 414 Furthermore, where acceptance by the city is important, it need not in40 SThe city was held immune from liability on the ground that in removing garbage and manure it was protecting the public against disease, a
governmental function.
409Tarras
v. City of St. Paul, (1899) 77 Minn. 57, 79 N. W. 649.
4
lOOlson v. City of St. Paul, (1919) 141 Minn. 434, 170 N. W. 586.
41
'Neidhardt v. City of Minneapolis, (1910) 112 Minn. 149, 127 N. W.
484; Sundell v. Village of Tintah, (1912) 117 Minn. 170, 134 N. W. 639.
412Miller v. City of Duluth, (1916) 134 Minn. 418, 159 N. W. 960.
413Collins v. Dodge. (1887) 37 Minn. 503, 35 N. W. 368; Miller v. City
of Duluth. (1916) 134 Minn. 418, 159 N. W. 960.
4"4Phelps v. City of Mankato, (1877) 23 Minn. 276. See Kelly v.
Southern Minnesota Ry. Co.. (1881) 28 Minn. 98, 9 N. W. 588.
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volve any formal action by the council. If the city expends money
in repair of the street and exercises control over it, it is liable for
injuries resulting from its defective condition. 4"
Since acceptance by user on the part of the public is sufficient
to create the duty to repair and consequent liability for failure to
repair, it necessarily follows that the fact that a street or sidewalk
was constructed by a private individual and not by the municipality
does not relieve the municipality from responsibility for defects. 16
On the other hand, the court has held that there can be no liability
on the part of a city for a sidewalk defect unless the public
authorities have rightfully taken charge of a privately-built walk
and have treated it as part of a general sidewalk."17 The case in
which this rule was established involved a walk built to connect
the public sidewalk with a store four feet back from the street.
There -was no evidence sufficient to justify a finding that the city
ever assumed control of or attempted to repair that portion of the
walk between the lot line and the building. It is to be doubted
whether it could have made any difference even if the city had
attempted to keep the walk in question in repair in that case,
since this would have involved an ultra vires act for which apparently the city is not liable. 418
Since a city or village is not bound to improve the full width
of its streets for travel, it may set apart a portion for boulevard
purposes if it can do so without substantial impairment of the
primary use of the street for travel; but in doing so, it has no right
to maintain anything on the boulevards, especially at the street
corners, in the nature of "a dangerous pitfall, or trap, or snare,
or like obstruction, whereby the traveler may be injured."''4 Apparently a pedestrian may cross a boulevard without forfeiting
his rights as a traveler. Likewise he may cross streets at places
other than crossings, the city being obliged to keep the streets as
well as the sidewalks and crossings safe for pedestrians.' 20 The
duty to maintain streets in a safe condition for travel applies to
roads and paths in parks as well as streets generally. '2- '
5
41
Shartle v. City of Minneapolis, (1871) 17 Minn. 308 (Gil. 284).
4t 6
Furnel v. City of St Paul, (1873) 20 Minn. 117 (Gil. 101); Graham
v. City of Albert Lea, (1892) 46 Minn. 201, 50 N. W. 1108.
41"Holmwood v. City of Duluth, (1916) 134 Minn. 137, 158 N. W. 827.
-8See
(1942) 26 Mn.TNEs5oTA LAw
'%vEw
299.
9 McDonald v. City of St. Paul, (1901) 82 Minn.
4"
308, 84 N. W. 1022.
42
°Thorsell v. City of Virginia, (1917) 138 Minn.55, 163 N. W. 976.
421
Kleopfert v. City of Minneapolis, (1903) 90 Minn. 158, 95 N. NV.
908; Ackeret v. City of Minneapolis, (1915) 129 Minm. 190, 151 N. W. 976;
Nelson v. City of Duluth, (1927) 172 Minn. 76, 214 N. W. 774.
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No case appears to have arisen involving the liability of a
municipal corporation for defects in streets it lawfully maintains
outside its boundaries. It has been held that where it is without
authority to maintain such a street (forming the approach to a
ferry), it is not liable for a death resulting from its alleged
negligence. 42 2 In the case of second class cities, the same rule is
adopted by statute as to highways outside the boundaries of the
424
state 4 2 3 which such cities are precluded from maintaining.
There is somewhat limited authority for cities and villages to maintain roads outside municipal limits. 42 5 Where defects occur in roads
so maintained, the rules of liability for resulting damages are
probably the same as if the highways were within the municipal
corporation, in spite of the fact that there would be no liability
420
were the same roads to be maintained by the county or town.
Of course, if the roads later are brought within the municipal
limits through the annexation of adjacent territory, the obligation to repair those roads is no different from that which it has
4 27
toward other municipal streets.
An interesting problem, mentioned earlier,428 is presented with
regard to streets whose maintenance responsibility is primarily or
exclusively on some unit of government other than the municipal
corporation within which they are located. Trunk highways are
the most numerous class of such streets. These highways, established under article 16 of the Minnesota constitution, run through
cities and villages as well as in the unincorporated areas of the
state. Where the trunk highway covers the full width of the
municipal street, the municipal corporation is not responsible for
defects in the highway. 429 It may not spend funds for its mainte4 22

Peterson v. City of Jordan, (1917)

135 Minn. 384, 160 N. W. 1026.

Maintenance of such a street is no longer ultra vires.
Minn. Stats., sec. 2578.
4231 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1657.
4241 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1656.

1 Mason's 1927

These statutes were un-

doubtedly intended for Winona, for which a good deal of legislation general
in form but special in application has been passed.
4251 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 2578.
4 26
1t is no more anomalous that streets within municipal limits may

be designated as trunk highways, in which case there is no liability for

defects.
42

7Moore v. City of St. Paul, (1901) 82 Minn. 494, 85 N. W. 163.
428Supra, (1942) 26 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 319.
429

Lundstrom v. Giacomo, (1935)

194 Minn. 624, 261 N. W. 465. See
166 Minn. 416, 208
N. W. 132, the leading case on the respective responsibilities of the state
and municipal corporations over the maintenance of trunk highways running
Automatic Signal Advertising Co. v. Babcock, (1926)
through cities and villages.
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nance.4 30 There seems no question, however, but that it is still
obliged to maintain the rest of the street in good condition where
the highway department takes over only a portion of the street
as a trunk highway; and consequently it is liable for damages
resulting from its negligence in meeting that obligation. No case
appears to have arisen involving an accident in the municipallymaintained portion of the street, possibly because accidents are
more likely to occur in the center lanes where vehicles ordinarily
travel. In view of the fact that the injured driver or pedestrian
has no recourse against the state if the accident happens in the
trunk highway proper, it is likely that doubts about the respective
jurisdiction of the state and the municipal corporation will be resolved against the latter. This tendency is perhaps reflected in the
case of Crist v. Minneapolis, St. Paid & Sault Sic. Marie Railway Co.,431 though a railroad rather than a municipal corporation
was the defendant there. The plaintiff was injured when his car
crashed through a railing of a bridge over the defendant railroad.
He attempted to show that the accident was due to a defect in the
approach to a bridge which had been taken over and maintained
as a part of the Wisconsin trunk highway system. The defendant
sought to escape liability on the ground that the approach and the
bridge were part of the trunk highway system. The fact that
public officials assumed that it was their duty to care for and
maintain the highway up to the end of the bridge was dearly
established. The court held the defendant liable, nevertheless; the
maintenance of the highway by public officials did not relieve the
defendant of legal liability resting upon it. Public officials, even
by contract, could not make the defendant immune from claims
for damage resulting from negligence in the maintenance of the
bridge and its approaches. "From the liability resulting from a
nonperformance of this uncompensated duty there is no escape. It
is definite, certain and imperative." 432 Two justices dissented,
however, pointing out that the charge of negligence was not put
upon a defect of construction but one of inspection and maintenance, and the primary duty of inspection and maintenance is on
43
the state.
43OAutomatic Signal Advertising Co. v. Babcock, (1926)
416, 208 N. W. 132.
43](1925)

166 Minn.

162 Minn. 1, 202 N. W. 57.

432(1925) 162 Minn. 1, 7, 202 N. W. 57.
433

"It is enough that the railway must repair or reconstruct when called
upon. It is too much, at least as a matter of common sense and sound
economy, and another useless and expensive duplication of effort for which
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A similar problem, never adjudicated, is raised when a county
or town maintains a road within municipal limits. State aid roads,
maintained by the counties from the proceeds of the state one-mill
road and bridge levy, 43 ' may be designated within the corporate
limits of any borough, village, or city of the fourth class, and may
83
then be improved by the county like other state aid roads.
County aid roads, constructed and maintained by the county from
its share of the gasoline tax may be designated in the unplatted
portion of any village038 or in any portion of villages in certain
counties. 7 If any village included within a town neglects to
keep its streets in repair, the town board of the town may make
repairs and improvements.43 8 In the last case, the primary responsibility for maintenance is upon the village, so there should be
little doubt that the village is responsible in case of defects even
though the town board has attempted to make repairs. In the
case of state aid roads, and possibly county aid roads within
municipal limits, however, the primary responsibility may be upon
the county, until the designation of the street as a state or county
aid road is revoked ;431 but whether or not this fact results in relieving the city or village from liability is uncertain. The language
of the dissent in the Crist Case440 suggests that the municipal corporation would not be liable; the decision itself can hardly be
considered as in conflict with that view.
Two other cases involve remotely similar situations, though
they are far from conclusive on this point. Austin v. Village of
Tonka Bay 441 was an action for damages to plaintiff's land rein the end the people must pay, for the law to leave upon the railroad any
duty of inspection and any primary duty of maintenance, when the state, as
the sovereign, has assumed the whole duty of inspection and the primary

duty of maintenance, leaving the railway only the secondary duty to repair

or reconstruct when so ordered by competent government authority." The
quotation
is from Justice Stone's dissenting opinion, p. 8.
434The 1941 legislature, however, abolished the one-mill levy and provided for the maintenance of this system of roads from the proceeds of the
gasoline tax. Minn. Laws 1941, chs. 60, 61.
4351

Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 2560, subdiv. 5.

Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., sec. 2720-92e.
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., 1940 Supp., sec. 2720-93. At present
this authority extends only to Cook and Lake of the Woods Counties.
4363
4373

Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 1052.
439Inboth cases, the duty of maintenance is placed on the county. 1
4381

Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., secs. 2560, 2561; 3 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats.,

1940 Supp., sec. 2720-92e. However, the attorney general has recently

ruled that improvement and maintenance by the county of state aid roads

within municipal limits is optional. Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. August 13, 1940.
440Crist v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1925) 162 Minn. 1,
202 N. W. 57.
441(1915) 130 Minn. 359, 153 N. W. 738.
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suiting from the construction by the county of a road within the
village limits under a law giving Hennepin County authority to
construct bridges and roads within villages without receiving their
consent. In holding the village not liable, the court said, 44 "It may be conceded that where a village is incorporated and
includes within its territory part of a county road, the portion of
the road within the village as a general rule becomes a village
street and subject to village control; but it is entirely competent
for the legislature to give a county control over such highways
to any extent it sees fit. . .. Of course, it is the duty of the village
to keep its streets safe for travel, but no failure to perform such
duty is involved in the present case."
In that case, however, maintenance responsibilities were not placed
on the county, so the dictum in the last sentence can hardly be
considered determinative of the question of liability of a city or
village for defects in a state aid or county aid road within its limits.
Moore v. City of St. Paul 44 3 involved a personal injury action
resulting from a defect in a bridge which was outside of the city
limits when constructed by the county under an act providing that
the bridge was to be kept in good repair by the county. The cast
end of the bridge was in a township which had been taken into the
city limits by the time the accident occurred. The court found the
defendant city liable, pointing out,
"The obligation of the city with respect to the law did not
provide that the county should keep the same in repair. There may
be a concurrent liability on the part of the city and county, but
the city cannot escape its responsibility on the claim that the
county is also liable. . . .The provisions of the charter above referred to must be considered as placing upon the city the obligation
to keep every highway and bridge within its limits in good repair
for public use, without regard to what the law may have required
in that respect prior to the time such
44 highways and bridges came
within the jurisdiction of the city." '
The*parallel to state aid and county aid roads within municipal
limits is only partial. The law contemplates that such roads
should be maintained by the county. The trunk highway law has
been construed as making illegal any expenditures by cities and
villages for the maintenance of trunk highways within their
limits;445 but it is questionable whether the state aid and county
aid road laws go that far. Certainly there is no express provision
relieving the city or village of "duties and responsibilities" in the
442(1915) 130 Minn. 359. 364, 153 N. W. 738.
443(1901) 82 Minn. 494, 85 N. W. 163.
444(1901) 82 Minn. 494, 496, 85 N. W. 163.
445Automatic Signal Advertising Co. v. Babcock, (1926) 166 Minn. 416,
208 N. W. 132.
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maintenance of state aid and county aid roads within city or village

limits, 446 as there is in the case of trunk highways. 447 It seems

unlikely that a municipal corporation would be held immune from
liability for damages resulting from defects in state aid or county
aid roads within municipal limits.
d. Defects for Which Liability Attaches.-Cases in which a
municipal corporation has been sought to be charged with liability
for negligence in the maintenance of its streets and sidewalks have
displayed a wide assortment of alleged defects. All have, of course,
involved applications of the general principles of negligence as
they affect municipal corporations. It frequently has been stated
that a city is required to exercise reasonable care to keep its
streets reasonably safe for public use, but it is not required to
anticipate and guard against improbable dangers. 448 The court
has said that it is not inclined to hold municipalities to the exercise
of more than reasonable care in the maintenance of streets and sidewalks or to impose on them the duty of making anything like a
microscopic inspection. 449 In other words a city is not an insurer
of the safety of its streets ;450 but many of the cases hold the municipality to such a high degree of care that there is frequently
displayed a tendency to make the safety of the traveler assured .4
This tendency is due partly to the fact that the negligence of the
municipal corporation is ordinarily a question for the jury which
the court usually is reluctant to take from them by finding an
absence of negligence as a matter of law. The degree of duty is
measured by the likelihood of accident and is commensurate with
the risks and dangers incurred ;452 no inflexible rule can be laid
down.

45 3

446As a matter of fact, it was not originally contemplated when the
counties were first given a share of the gasoline tax for the construction
and maintenance of roads that these roads would extend within municipal
limits. This has been provided for since by sets of very limited application
which make no attempt to clarify the question of responsibility that might
thus be created. In the case of towns the question could never be of more
than academic interest in view of the immunity of towns from liability for
negligence in maintaining town roads.
4471 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 2554, subdiv. 4a.
48
Spiering v. City of Hutchinson, (1921) 150 Minn. 305, 185 N. W.
375; 449
Tracey v. City of Minneapolis, (1932) 185 Minn. 380, 241 N. W. 390.
Sumner v. City of Northfield, (1905) 96 Minn. 107, 104 N. W. 686.
450
Blyhl v. Village of Waterville, (1894) 57 Minn. 115, 58 N. W. 817;
Baker
451v. City of St. Paul, (1936) 198 Minn. 437, 270 N. W. 154.
This fact has been noted by David, Municipal Liability for Tortious
and Omissions, (1936) 54.
Acts452
Bieber v. City of St. Paul, (1902) 87 Minn. 35, 91 N. W. 20.
453
Kellogg v. Village of Janesville, (1885) 34 Minn. 132, 24 N. W. 359.
"The conditions are liable to be so different in relation to different walks,
or different portions of the same walk, and so many contingencies are
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It is obviously a lack of due care, for the consequences of
which the municipal corporation is responsible, to allow an unguarded and unlighted excavation to exist in a street.' 3 ' A city
or village can usually avoid liability resulting from excavations
made in connection with construction projects by erecting proper
barriers and lighting the excavation at night. 3 5
A hole need not be so large as to be classed as an excavation or
a pit to make a municipal corporation responsible for resulting
damages. A V-shaped hole in a sidewalk just large enough to
permit a pedestrian's foot to be caught in it has been held sufficient
to justify a jury's finding of negligence.0 8
"Neither the dimensions of the hole nor the depth of the depression are necessarily the exclusive test of danger. A small Vshaped hole may contain many of the elements of hazard to
which a railway frog exposes. It could easily become covered by
leaves and the like, so as to more readily escape observation. It
could, indeed, become more perilous
than a much larger and
57
more conspicuous depression."'
A missing plank in a wooden sidewalk may also subject a city to
liability for negligence. 458 So may an open drain at the side of a
highway.459 In the latter case a pedestrian jumped to the side
of the road to avoid being hit by a speeding car, and was injured
when she fell into the drain. The court found the incident which
caused her to leave the highway, while unusual, "not so extraordinary or unknown as to be without the range of possibilities
60
which may reasonably be anticipated."4
Mere depressions, or differences in grade in two different portions of streets or sidewalks, may be sufficient to constitute neglilikely to arise, that it can only be determined from the situation and circumstances of each case whether reasonable care has been exercised in
the premises."
454
Cleveland v. City of St Paul, (1871) 18 Minn. 279 (Gil. 255);
Collins v. Dodge, (1887) 37 Minn. 503, 35 N. W. 368; Miller v. City of
Duluth,
455 (1916) 134 Minn. 418, 159 N. W. 960.
See Collins v. Dodge, (1887) 37 Minn. 503, 35 N. W. 368; Miller v.
City of Duluth, (1916) 134 Minn. 418, 159 N. AV. 960; Thorsell v. City of
Virginia, (1917) 138 Minn. 55, 163 N. W. 976; Wilson v. City of Montevideo, (1936) 196 Minn. 532, 265 N. W. 438.
45
Sumner v. City of Northfield, (1905) 96 Minn. 107, 104 N. W. 686;
Laystrom v. City of Ada, (1910) 110 Minn. 340, 125 N. V. 507; Klaysmat
v. Village of Hibbing, (1927) 172 Minn. 524, 215 N. V. 851. See also
7
Estabrook
v.City of Duluth, (1919) 142 Minn. 318, 172 N. AV. 123.
. 45 Sumner v. City of Northfield, (1905)
96 Minn. 107, 109, 104 N. W.
686. 58
' Taylor v. City of Mankato, (1900) 81 Minn. 276, 83 N. XV. 1084.
459
Neidhardt v. City of Minneapolis, (1910) 112 Minn. 149, 127 N. IV.
484.480(1910) 112 Minn. 149, 155, 127 N. W. 484.
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gence. In McGandy v. City of Marshall,40 ' the plaintiff was allowed recovery for injuries sustained when she stumbled on a
sidewalk block 13 inches above the level of the next block. Recovery also has been permitted for an injury resulting from a
sidewalk on one street being six to nine inches higher than that on
a cross street, thus making a perpendicular drop of this amount. 02
However, the existence of a step properly constructed from a sidewalk to a street crossing is not a defect, 403 nor is a slant or slope
between two portions of sidewalk when it is occasioned by the
fact that one property owner has cleaned his sidewalk of snow
and ice while another has not.46 4
Cases involving negligence in the maintenance of wooden sidewalks are now largely of historical interest, but this subject was
once a frequent source of litigation. A municipal corporation is
bound to take notice of the certain tendency of wooden sidewalks
to decay and become in an unsafe condition. 40 1 Holes or other
defects resulting from decay have been held to justify a finding of
liability.' A loose board in a sidewalk may give rise to liability.610
Projections as well as holes may be classed as defects causing
liability. Allowing protruding hinges on iron shutters in a sidewalk opening over an areaway evidently may constitute negligence.460 So may a post in the line of travel at an intersection of
two streets.'0 5 On the other hand, a large stone at the corner of a
401(1929) 178 Minn. 326, 227 N. W. 177.
40 2 Tabor v. City of St. Paul, (1886) 36 Minn. 188, 30 N. W. 765.
63
4 Miller y. City of St. Paul, (1888) 38 Minn. 134, 36 N. W. 271.
460Kelleher v. City of West St. Paul, (1935) 193 Minn. 487, 258 N. W.
834. While the majority of the court said that to hold the municipality

liable in such a situation would virtually make it an insurer against all
accidents, two justices dissented on the ground that a fact question was presented.5 The verdict had been for the plaintiff.
40 Kennedy v. City of St. Paul, (1903) 90 Minn. 523, 97 N. W. 419;
Murphy v. City of South St. Paul, (1907) 101 Minn. 341, 112 N. W. 259.
4O6Johnson v. City of St. Paul, (1893) 52 Minn. 364, 54 N. W. 735;
Burrows v. Village of Lake Crystal, (1895) 61 Minn. 357, 63 N. W. 745;
Murphy v. City of South St. Paul, (1907) 101 Minn. 341, 112 N. W. 259;
Estabrook v. City of Duluth, (1919) 142 Minn. 318, 172 N. W. 123. The
latter6 case involved a defective creosote block in a crosswalk pavement.
4' Lenz v. City of St. Paul. (1902) 87 Minn. 85, 91 N. W. 256;
Kennedy v. City of St. Paul, (1903) 90 Minn. 523, 97 N. W. 419. Cf.
Spiering v. City of Hutchinson, (1921) 150 Minn. 305, 185 N. W. 375,
where the city was held not chargeable with negligence in failing to foresee
and guard against the occurrence which gave rise to the action. A plank
had been removed by city employees from a defective culvert and laid
in the bottom of the ditch at the side of the street. A child playing in the
street had lifted one end of the plank and let it fall in such a way that
a nail 8in the plank pierced his foot, causing lockjaw from which he died.
46 Fortmeyer v. National Biscuit Company, (1911) 116 Minn. 158,
133 N. W. 461.
469Phelps v. City of Mankato, (1877) 23 Minn. 276.
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lot at the intersection of two sidewalks is not a defect when the
rounded portion projects beyond the lot line at a height of four or
five inches.4 7 0 An iron pipe stretched across a sidewalk in connection with a paving project may give rise to municipal liability.'T,
A manhole with sloping sides may also justify a finding of negligence on the part of the municipal corporation. 7" - So may a manhole which tips when stepped on. 74 3 A clock standard maintained
on a sidewalk with the knowledge of municipal authorities may
give rise to liability.4 74 A deposit of rock, dirt, or building material, while a legitimate use of the street when made temporarily in
connection with building, may constitute a defective condition if
75
left unguarded and unlighted.
A projection, such as a light pole, in a street may involve negligence in connection with certain accidents but not with others.
Rytlwr v. City of Austi. 7 8 is an example. There an electric light
company pole stood in the gutter of a street about five inches from
the curb. A horse hitched to the pole could not get his foot fast
in the space next to him between the pole and the curbstone but
could get his foot caught by raising it over the curb and putting
it into the space on the opposite side of the pole. The plaintiff's
horse stepped up on the curb, caught his foot on the other side and
broke his leg trying to get loose. The court held as a matter of
law that the maintenance of the pole in this location did not constitute negligence resulting in liability for this injury. It was
conceded that an entirely different case would have been presented
if the plaintiff had been driving at night and collided with the pole
in the dark.
Whether the lack of barriers at the side of a street to guard
against falling into ditches or down embankments constitutes negligence depends on a number of factors such as the location, the
frequency of use of the street, the safety of the street itself in the
absence of barriers, and the like. The general principle has been
stated thus:
"It is undoubtedly true that a municipal corporation, having
4700'Keefe v. Dietz v. City of St. Paul, (1919) 142 Minn. 445, 172

N. W. 696.
-fDougherty v. Garrick, (1931) 184 Minn. 436, 239 N. NV. 153.
472 Rasmusen v. City of Duluth, (1916) 133 Minn. 134, 157 N. NV. 1088.
4=L'Herault
v. City of Minneapolis, (1897) 69 Minn. 261, 72 N. V. 73.
4
4See
Mueller v. City of Duluth, (1922) 152 Minn. 159, 188 N. V. 205.
5
47 Grant v. City of Stillwater, (1886) 35 Minn. 242, 28 N. W. 660; cf.
Nye v. Dibley, (1903) 88 Minn. 465, 93 N. W. 524, involving liability of the
person responsible for the pile of material. Analogous cases involving
excavations rather than deposits are cited in note 454, supra.
476 (1898)

72 Minn. 24, 74 N. W. 1017.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

the duty of keeping public streets in repair and safe condition, is
not bound to go beyond their limits for the purpose, nor is it generally bound to erect railings to prevent travellers straying off the
street to adjoining land upon which there may be dangerous places;
but it is bound to provide such guards where the street itself is
unsafe for travel by reason of the
477 close proximity of excavations,
embankments, deep water, etc.1
Seldom is the question of negligence in failing to maintain guard
rails determinable as a matter of law. 8 Ordinarily it cannot be
held that a municipal corporation is negligent in failing to fence
off an embankment at the edge of a country road
"unless the place is peculiarly dangerous, as where the roadway
is narrow and the sides precipitous or where there is something
along the side of the highway which it should be foreseen is
ordinarily likely to frighten horses, and result in precipitating them
or the vehicle, over
' 9 the dangerous place, as, for instance, passing
railroad trains. 47
It makes no difference in the principles controlling that the dangerous place is at the end instead of alongside the street.4 0
It seems clearly established that barriers are required on
bridges to protect travelers against falling off the bridge,4 81 the
only question of negligence in such case being the adequacy of the
barrier. In Klasens v. Village of Kasota,4 8 2 the negligence claimed
was that the two feet-six inch railing was not high enough, and
the court sustained a verdict for the plaintiff. In Tracey v. City
of Minneapolis,483 however, the court sustained a directed verdict
for the defendant. Two automobiles had collided on a bridge in
the city, the force of the impact deflecting them, throwing one over
the sidewalk, through the iron rail and into the river, killing the
plaintiff's intestate. The negligence claimed was that the wheel
guard was not high enough and the railing on the outer edge of
the bridge was not strong enough. The court said that to guard
against such an occurrence
"would have necessitated the construction of a wall of iron
or concrete, which would be a very onerous burden to the taxpayers . . . it is not the purpose of a curb, curb rail, or an out477
Ray v. City of St. Paul, (1889) 40 Minn. 458. 459, 42 N. W. 297,
citing City of St. Paul v. Kuby, (1863) 8 Minn. 125 (Gil. 154).
47sWatson
v. City of Duluth, (1915) 128 Minn. 446, 151 N. W. 143.
47
9Tarras v. City of Winona. (1897) 71 Minn. 22. 24, 73 N. W. 505.
480
Ray v. City of St. Paul. (1889) 40 Minn. 458, 459, 42 N. W. 297.
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Klasens v. Village of Kasota. (1914) 128 Minn. 47, 150 N. W. 221;
Tracey v. City of Minneapolis. (1932) 185 Minn. 380, 241 N. W. 390; see
Tarras v. City of Winona. (1897) 71 Minn. 22, 73 N. W. 505; Grant v.
City of Brainerd. (1902) 86 Minn. 126, 90 N. W. 307.
482(1914) 128 Minn. 47. 150 N. W. 221.
483(1932) 185 Minn. 380, 241 N. W. 390.
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side rail to protect against such an assault. The purpose is to
guard against ordinary contingencies or those which may be reasonably anticipated. The law does not demand a perfect highway under all circumstances. . . .Accidents of this character are
of such remote and improbable occurrence that negligence cannot
be founded upon failure to maintain a barrier to adequately resist
the applied force." 48 '
Two justices, however, felt that the adequacy of the barrier was
for the jury.
The case of Lineburg v. City of St. Paud"5 was decided on
somewhat similar reasoning. There a child of five and a half had
crawled over or through a three and one-half foot fence of two
railings and fell over a precipice which skirted the edge of the
sidewalk. Conceding that the place in question was peculiarly
dangerous and needed suitable barriers to protect against injuries,
the court found as a matter of law that the city's duty had been
fulfilled in this case. "No such extraordinary duty should be imposed on the city," said the court, "as that of maintaining a barrier
so high and so close that cildren cannot find ways or means to
surmount it.""' City of St. Paul v. Kuby, 487 involving a somewhat similar accident, was distinguished on the ground that there
the barrier was only a single rail which would not prevent a child
from falling out over the precipice. Later the court refused to
find absence of negligence as a matter of law when a small girl
fell over an embankment along a well-traveled sidewalk in
Duluth where there was no guard rail at all. The court said that
the expense incident to the city's performance of its duty was
not available as an excuse for nonperformance, safety of life and
limb being the paramount consideration. 48
Since there is a duty to provide barriers only where the street
itself is unsafe for travel if there are no guard rails, there is no
negligence as a matter of law where no barrier is provided at
the edge of a gravel path about six feet wide and an automobile
is precipitated down a slope when it is backed over the gutter and
489
the path.
484(1932) 185 Minn. 380. 382, 241 N. W. 390.
485(1898) 71 Minn. 245, 73 N. V. 723.
488(1898) 71 Minn. 245, 247, 73 N. W. 723.
487(1863) 8 Minn. 154. (Gil. 125).
48sWatson v. City of Duluth, (1915) 128 Minn. 446, 151 N. IV. 143.
489Briglia v. City of St. Paul. (1916) 134 Minn. 97. 158 N. IV. 794;
cf. Grant v. City of Brainerd, (1902) 86 Minn. 126, 90 N. NV. 307. In the
last cited case the plaintiff's horse was frightened by a bicycle and backed
over an embankment on the side of a bridge approach. Negligence was held
a question for the jury.
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The duty to provide barriers exists more commonly in the case
of excavations in the street. Excavations are frequently necessary in connection with construction projects-the street itself, or
the installation or repair of sewer and water mains-but unless
travelers rightfully on the street are protected by barriers and
lights against falling into them, the duty of the municipality to
490
maintain its streets in safe condition has not been met.

Liability may exist in a converse situation when a barrier is
maintained where there should be none. In hlen v. Village of
Edgerton49 1 a village had roped off its main street during a celebration. The plaintiff failed to see the rope and drove into it.
The question of defendant's negligence was held to be for the
jury, its verdict for the plaintiff being upheld on appeal. Klcopfert v. City of Minneapolis"2 involved a bicycle accident occurring
as the result of a rope placed across a boulevard. A judgment for
the plaintiff was sustained on appeal. A guy wire strung across
49
the street has been held to subject the city to liability. 8
A barrier maintained under somewhat different circumstances
was involved in Petrich v. Village of Chishol1 49 4 where the court
again held that the question of negligence was for the jury. In
that case, the village had passed an ordinance permitting the
school district to bar traffic on a street between a playground and
a school. This was held not to be actionable negligence as a
matter of law.
"The exclusion of vehicles ...

is so obviously dictated by what

due care demands to protect the children attending the schools
that those responsible therefor should not be held guilty of negligence unless the means adopted to divert the '49vehicles are such
as the ordinarily prudent person would not use.

5

If a barrier, a hole, or a post may constitute such defect as to
result in municipal liability, a building in the street is even less
defensible. McDowell v. Village of Preston410 was a case of this
kind. A merchant in Preston built and maintained a structure in
the street in which to conduct his business while his permanent
building was being erected on his lot. The plaintiff was injured
49 0

See, for example, O'Leary v. City of Mankato, (1874) 21 Minn. 65;
Weiser v. City of St. Paul, (1902) 86 Minn. 26, 90 N. W. 8; and cases
cited in note 454, supra.
491(1918) 140 Minn. 322, 168 N. W. 12.
492(1904) 93 Minn. 118, 100 N. W. 669.
493Larson v. Ring, (1890) 43 Minn. 88, 44 N. W. 1078.
494(1930) 180 Minn. 407, 231 N. W. 14.
495(1930) 180 Minn. 407, 410, 231 N. W. 14.
496(1908) 104 Minn. 263, 116 N. W. 470.
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when her horse ran away and the buggy came in contact with the
building. The court held that a building or similar structure maintained in a public street by a third party for his private use is a
nuisance although sufficient space is left for the passage of vehicles
and pedestrians, and the municipal corporation is guilty of negligence if it knowingly permits the street so to be obstructed.
If a municipal corporation allows in a public street a structure
such as a platform to be used by the public as a part of the street
even though placed there by a private person, it is its duty to see
that it is in a safe condition to be used by the public as a part of the
structure is not in the most usually
street. This is so although the 97
travelled portion of the street.
The curb is a part of the street, and a city is bound to maintain
it in a safe and usable condition. If the support for the curb is
so weakened that it gives way when an automobile backs against
it, a jury is entitled to find that the city has been guilty of negi40 8
gence for the consequences of which it is responsible.
mere slipperiness, when not caused by ice or
Q
Occasionally
499
snow, may give rise to liability. In one case liability was imposed for an injury occasioned when plaintiff slipped on a sidewalk where limestone blocks or flagging sidewalk had been worn
smooth.500 The court cited, apparently with approval, cases from
Indiana and Massachusetts holding that a municipal corporation
may be liable for damages from a smooth and slippery sidewalk
constructed of different material from the surrounding walk. In
another case where the plaintiff had been injured in slipping on a
manhole, the abutting property owner and the city were both
held liable.501 The court said it did not seem unreasonable to
compel property owners who are permitted to place these covers
in their sidewalks to keep the surface rough as provided by city
ordinance. The city was liable because it ought to have known
of the existence of the danger. On the other hand it has been held
as a matter of law not to be negligence for a city to treat creosote
- paving with petroleum oil, leaving the pavement slippery
As has been mentioned before, failure to light streets is not
49

775.

7Estelle v. Village of Lake Crystal, (1880)

9

27 Minn. 243, 6 N. W.

4 sKimball v. City of St. Paul, (1914) 128 Minn. 95, 150 N. W. 379.
4s9Negligence in the removal of ice and snow is discussed, infra, pp.
507-511.
5000'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1911) 116 Minn. 249, 133 N. V. 981.
50
Latell v. Cunningham, (1913) 122 Minn. 144, 142 N. W. 141.
5 2Fleming v. City of Minneapolis, (1926) 168 Minn. 80, 209 N. W. 902.
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ordinarily actionable negligence, though it may make a partially
obstructed street or one out of repair unsafe for travel when it
might be safe for travel if the light were adequate. 05 3 There is,
however, a duty to call attention to temporary obstructions or
excavations by means of lights. 0 4 A kerosene lantern on a plank
set on a pile of sand to warn travelers of an excavation is not such
an attraction to children or such an inherent danger as to constitute an "attractive nuisance" within the doctrine of the turntable cases. "The city could not be required to place or secure such
lights so that children could not reach or disturb them. It is not
easy to see how the city could do so and still have them serve their
' 505
purpose.
An unusual street condition occasioned liability in Svendsen v.
Village of Alden.500 The three and one-half year old daughter
of the plaintiff in that case fell into a pool of hot water collected in
a sag hole in a village street adjacent to a sidewalk. The water
came through a drain from the steam heating plant of the local
school district and had its outlet in the street, the drain having
been built with the village's consent. Action against the school
district was dismissed, but the village was held liable both in the
lower court and on appeal. It was held that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that the defendant was negligent in not keeping the street in good condition?0
A ladder standing in such a position that a wind can blow it
down and injure pedestrians or travelers in a street may be such
a defect as to subject to liability a city or village which permits
it to stand there. 0 8 Authorities responsible for the maintenance
of streets or roads have the duty of protecting against dangers
from falling trees and branches. Consequently it would appear
that as with ladders, a municipal corporation may be liable for
injuries from a falling tree which it should have anticipated might
be a menace to travelers.'0
553Miller v. City of St. Paul, (1888)

38 Minn. 134, 36 N. W. 271.

5O4See Collins v. Dodge, (1887) 37 Minn. 503, 35 N. W. 368 and cases
cited 05
in notes 454 and 490, supra.
5 Brown v. City of Minneapolis, (1917) 136 Minn. 177, 179, 161 N. W.
503.
5060(1907) 101 Minn. 158, 112 N. W. 10.
5o7Cf.

(1911)

the memorandum decision in Korpi v. Oliver Iron Mining Co.,

114 Minn. 525, 131 N. W. 372, where the defendant maintained an
unprotected vat in a Hibbing street into which hot water was dischared
from a pipe connection with defendant's steam boiler in an adjoining build-

ing. The company was held liable for injuries suffered when a child fell
into the vat. The village appears not to have been involved in that case.
05
0Moore
v. Townsend, (1899) 76 Minn. 64, 78 N. W. 880.
5OSee Zacharias v. Nesbitt, (1921) 150 Minn. 368, 185 N. W. 295.
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An interesting question is whether or not a traffic control
device can constitute a street defect so that a municipal corporation may be held liable for injuries resulting from a collision with
it. In one case, the court has held that it may.510
In Lamnont v. Stavanaugh,511 the plaintiff sought to argue that
the presence of a policeman with a known violent temper on the
municipal streets armed with a policeman's club constituted a
defective or dangerous condition of the streets which would impose a liability on the municipality for his tortious actions. The
court refused, however, to countenance this ingenious argument.
It is not always a defense that the defect complained of is not
on the street itself, for there may be liability for permitting things
.to be maintained near the street which make the street iself unsafe
for travel. For example, in Ray v. City of St. Paul,12' the city
was held liable when someone fell off the end of a street and broke
his leg, the city having deposited snow and refuse at the foot of
the street in such a way as to make it difficult to tell the terminal
line of the street. The street was held to be in a defective condition under these circumstances.
Similarly a city has been held liable when it grades a street,
leaving a body of earth on a private lot overhanging the street
so that the embankment later caves in on a boy using the street.313
The court said the city could not "unnecessarily and unreasonably
endanger the lives and limbs of the passers-by upon the sidewalk,"
which it had done in this case.
Neidhardt v. City of Minneapolissll applied the same principle
where the defect complained of was off the street proper though
within the street lines. The city was there held liable for an injury
resulting when a pedestrian fell into an open drain at the edge of a
covered culvert at the side of the road when she jumped to avoid
being hit by a speeding car.
It would be unreasonable, of course, to extend this principle
to cover all kinds of alleged "defects" allowed to exist near roads
and streets, and the court on several occasions has refused to hold
the municipal corporation liable in cases of this kind. In one
case,515 a contractor was operating a concrete mixer next to an
alley in Waseca. Someone drove his team into the alley near the
5
1OFitzgerald v. Village of Bovey, (1928) 174 Minn. 450, 219 N. W.
774. This case is discussed later. See text at footnote 649.
511(1915) 129 Minn. 321, 152 N. W. 720.
512(1890) 44 Minn. 340, 46 N. W. 675.
513
Nichols v. City of St. Paul, (1899) 44 Minn. 494, 47 N. W. 168.
54(1910) 112 Minn. 149. 127 N. W. 484.
515Seewald v. Schmidt, (1914) 127 Minn. 375, 149 N. W. 655.
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mixer, and the horses became frightened by the noise of the gasoline engine, ran away and injured another horse. In an action joining the city, the driver of the team, and the contractor as defendants, the court permitted a verdict for the plaintiff to stand
only against the contractor. It was pointed out that the concrete
mixer was not in the alley, and was not a nuisance which could be
abated by the city.
Some of the cases involving a failure to erect barriers to protect against a traveler's falling over an embankment are of the
same type. It has been held that there is no negligence in leaving
an embankment off the street unguarded when it is far enough
away so that travel on the street is not made unsafe on that account. 516
A street may be negligently maintained if overhanging objects
fall down and injure travelers. Thus if an awning in a condition
dangerous and unsafe to passers beneath it is permitted to overhang a public street, the street is not in a safe condition and.the
municipal corporation may be liable to one hit when it falls."'
Similarly it may be liable if a crossbar from a pole used in connection with a municipal fire alarm system is allowed to become
rotten and fall,"' or a painter's ladder, after standing in a street
for several days, is allowed to fall during a wind, 15 as a result
of which a passerby is injured. But while the duty to keep streets
and sidewalks in a safe condition for public use includes the duty
to protect from falling objects as well as from defects and obstacles
underfoot, this is not an absolute duty. Consequently where a
wooden cornice fell from a building during an ordinary windstorm and injured a pedestrian, the jury was permitted to find that
the city was not negligent in failing to find that it had decayed.
The decay, of which there had been no evidence, could not have
been determined without tearing off some of the boards and tin
with which the header and plate were enclosed. Under the circumstances, the duty of inspection was held not to be a positive
one, the lower court having correctly charged that whether or
not there was a duty to make inspection was a question entirely
for the jury.520
536McHugh v. City of St. Paul, (1897) 67 Minn. 441, 70 N. W. 5;
Briglia7 v. City of St. Paul, (1916) 134 Minn. 97, 158 N. W. 794.
5l Bohen v. City of Waseca, (1884) 32 Minn. 176, 19 N. W. 730, 50
Am. Rep.
564.
518Hillstrom v. City of St. Paul, (1916) 134 Minn. 451, 159 N. W. 1076.
51DMoore v. Townsend, (1899) 76 Minn. 64, 78 N. W. 880.
2(OHeidemann v. City of Sleepy Eye, (1935) 195 Minn. 611, 264 N. W.
212. One judge felt that the plaintiff had no case as a matter of law.
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Like projections, obstructions, holes and similar menaces to
travel, snow or ice on sidewalks or streets may subject the
municipal corporation to liability for injuries resulting from
them, but the principle adopted by the courts in such cases has
imposed on the city or village less of a duty to remove than if
the defect were an obstruction or an excavation in the street.
It is well settled that mere slipperiness of streets and sidewalks,
caused by an accumulation of ice and snow, creates no liability
for injuries to persons resulting from that condition. However,
where ice and snow are permitted to accumulate to such an
extent and for so long a time that ridges and hummocks are
formed as a result of which travel is made unsafe, the municipality
may be liable if this condition is brought about by its neglect.521
The rule has been stated in several cases522 and applied in
numerous other cases.52 3 In exempting municipal corporations
from damages resulting from mere slipperiness due to ice and
snow, the court has recognized the impossibility in this climate
of snow and ice. As Mr. Justice
of keeping the sidewalks124 clear
2
Mitchell put it in one case, 1
"In this climate, and in this new state, the duty of cities with
respect to ice and snow must necessarily be somewhat limited,
and care should be taken that they be not held to a degree of
diligence beyond what is reasonable, in view of their situation.
What reasonable care might require in a milder climate or in an
older country, where cities are more completely built, might be
too high a standard in this climate, for new cities, often em52xenkes v. City of Minneapolis, (1890) 42 Minn. 530. 44 N. W. 1026;

Wright v. City of St. Cloud, (1893) 54 Minn. 94, 55 N. V. 819; Smith v.
City of Cloquet, (1912) 120 Minn. 50, 139 N. AV. 141; McManus v. City
of Duluth, (1920) 147 Minn. 200, 179 N. W. 906; Callahan v. City of

Duluth, (1936) 197 Minn. 403, 267 N. W. 361. The rule is often stated so
as to imply-a distinction ipso facto between slippery and rough accumula-

tions; it is often forgotten that the essential question is negligence, of
which an accumulation of ridges may be evidence while a slippery condition 5may not. See note, (1937) 21 MINNFsOTA LAW REv, w 703, 706.
2See the cases cited in the previous note.
523Boyd v. City of Duluth, (1925) 164 Minn. 19, 204 N. W. 562; Freeman v. Village of Hibbing, (1926) 169 Minn. 353, 211 N. IV. 819; Niemi
v. Village of Hibbing, (1928) 175 N. W. 366, 221 N. W. 241; Barrett v.
City of Virginia, (1929) 179 Minn. 118, 228 N. W. 350; Bracke v. Lepinski,
(1933) 187 Minn. 585, 246 N. W. 249; Mathieson v. City of Duluth,
(1937) 201 Minn. 290, 276 N. W. 222. The applicable principles are discussed generally in a note, Liability of Municipality and Abutting Owner
for Injuries Resulting from Ice and Snow, (1937) 21 Mr.ImEsoTA LAW
R.Evmw 703. See also the annotations in 13 A. L. R. 17, 80 A. L. R 1151.
5240f course, the same rule applies to streets, but most of the ice and
snow cases have involved sidewalks because pedestrians, who are the
chief and almost the only recipients of injuries on this account, ordinarily
keep to the sidetwalks except in crossing streets.
525 Wright v. City of St. Cloud, (1893) 54 Minn. 94, 97, 55 N. V. 819.
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bracing within their limits much territory that is more rural
than urban. All that is required is reasonable care under all the
circumstances, and, in determining whether a defect is actionable,
consideration must be had, not only to the danger to be apprehended from it, but also to the practicability of remedying it.
No inflexible rule can be laid down as to the condition in which
reasonable care requires a city to keep its streets and sidewalks,
with respect to ice and snow. This must depend, in a measure,
on climate, amount of travel, means at command for making
repairs, and other varying circumstances."
It has been held that the digging of a trench from six to ten
feet long and three feet wide at the top in snow and ice along
the curb in a public street during the spring break-up and leaving it unguarded did not, at least under the particular facts of
that case, constitute negligence.5 20 Washing slush and dirt from
a sidewalk in thawing weather has been considered not careless
under ordinary circumstances, though the court said that it
doubtless may constitute negligence to flood a sidewalk with water
in freezing weather, as a result of which it is coated with a glaze
5 27

of ice.

While mere slipperiness ordinarily does not give rise to
liability on the part of the municipal corporation, the court has
drawn a distinction between slipperiness due to natural causes and
that of artificial creation. In Nichols v. Village of Buhl,528 people
living near the village ball had been permitted to take their water
supply from a water tap in the building. In the process some of
the water was spilled on the sidewalk and froze in small patches
of ice. The plaintiff slipped on the ice and was injured. He recovered a verdict against the village, which was sustained on
appeal. The court said that if the ice was of artificial creation, it
was immaterial whether the result sprang from acts or omissions
of officers of the village or from acts of third persons of which
the village should have had knowledge. "It is quite clear," said
the court, "that small patches of ice upon a sidewalk arc far
more treacherous and deceptive than rough and uneven frozen
ice and snow covering the entire walk and the case cannot be
distinguished from those conditions where negligence is shown.
Both are created by artificial means, and not from natural
52 9
causes."
52
0Dorgan v. City of St. Paul, (1917) 138 Minn. 347, 165 N. W. 131.
52T
Muggenburg v. Fink, (1926) 166 Minn. 411, 208 N. W. 134.
152 Minn. 494, 189 N. W. 407, 193 N. W. 28.
529(1922) 152 Minn. 494, 498, 189 N. W. 407, 193 N. W. 28.
228(1922)
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The same village was shortly afterwards involved in another
case in which the same principle was applied.530 At an alley
corner the village had installed iron covers over the curb gutter
in line with the sidewalk. It operated a V-shaped snow plow piling snow along the sides of the walk. During a thaw the snow
melted and the water passing under the iron aprons froze. The
gutter became clogged and the irons at the point of contact with
the walk and curb heaved about an inch and a half. The water
overflowed and became smooth, slippery ice, as a result of which
the plaintiff was injured. Her verdict, too, was sustained by the
supreme court. Failure to keep the apparatus clean and not the
action of the elements was considered the principal cause of the
dangerous condition. The court said:
"The law is not unreasonable in requiring a municipality to
incur the slight expense incident to the cleaning out of the gutter
under such iron aprons in order to avoid subjecting the pedestrians
to unsuspected dangers. Obviously the facts in this case do not
bring it within the smooth surface doctrine. The ice here was
the result of the piling of the snow with the snow plow, the
construction and installation of the gutter covered with the iron
aprons and the failure to keep the gutter clean. It was of artificial creation." 53'1
The Nichols Case is somewhat difficult to distinguish from
one decided thirty years earlier.53 2 The plaintiff in the earlier
case had slipped on an icy sidewalk which was smooth at the
point of his fall but somewhat thicker than elsewhere, because
water had escaped from a hose used in fighting fire a week before. The court dismissed the action and the plaintiff lost his
appeal. It was said that the fact that this ice was in part due to
an artificial cause made no difference.
"The liability of the city must rest upon some ground of fault
or neglect on the part of its officers who have charge of the
streets, and such fault or neglect is no more involved in renoving ice formed by water from hose than ice formed by rain from
the clouds" 533
Any decision to the contrary would have imposed on the municipality an impossible burden; yet it may be argued that under the
doctrine adopted later in Nichols v. Village of Buhl the question
of negligence should have been submitted to the jury. The only
53ORoberts v. Village of Buhl, (1924) 160 Minn. 398, 200 N. NV. 354.
-531(1924) 160 Minn. 398, 400, 200 N. W. 354.
532
Henkes v. City of Minneapolis, (1890) 42 Minn. 530, 44 N. V. 1026.

533(1890) 42 Minn. 530, 531, 44 N. Mr. 1026. Italics are the nresent
writer's. The court cited a Massachusetts case, Nason v. City of Boston,
(1867) 14 Allen 508, in support of its position.
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possible ground of distinction seems to be that in the Henlkes
Case the slipperiness would have been there (in the form of a
thinner coat of ice) regardless of the action of the fire department
in putting out the fire, while in Nichols v. Village of Buhl the
treacherous spots of ice were entirely of artificial creation.584 As
will be seen later, no significance can be attached to the fact that
in the Henkes Case, the fire department was engaged in the performance of a governmental function in extinguishing fires; nor
can any distinction be drawn between the two cases because in
the earlier one, the acts of servants of the municipality created
the unsafe condition while in the later case, third persons were
responsible.

535

Where an accident occurs as a result of an accumulation of
ice and snow but the ice and snow would not have accumulated
where it did were it not for a defect in street construction, the
municipality may be liable for resulting accidents.83 0 Thus if a
city unnecessarily constructs a manhole above street level with
sloping sides, and the sloping sides tend to increase the danger
of slipping when the crossing is covered with smooth ice, the city
may be liable for an injury occurring as a result of the slippery
sloping sides. Negligence has been held to be for the jury in such
a case. 537 Similarly when a city places or permits an unnecessary
jog and slant at an unexpected place along a walk that is otherwise level, it is placed under greater obligations to take precautions against danger from ice accumulations than if the walk
were upon a somewhat uniform slope where a pedestrian would
be more able to realize the danger if ice happened to exist. 588
Attempting to capitalize on the distinction between mere slipperiness and ridges of ice and snow in an action resulting from
a fall on ice between two ruts, the city of St. Paul in one case
claimed that its negligence was not the proximate cause of the
accident because the plaintiff slipped on the smooth icy surface
between the ruts while attempting to step over the second rut.
It argued that for this there was no liability, since a city is not
responsible for an accident which results from mere slipperiness

due to ice and snow. The court held, however, that this claim had
534 1n the latter case, the Henkes decision was treated as though it

involved a natural accumulation of ice and snow.
535TIis is snecifically held in Nichols v. Village of Buhl, (1922) 152
Minn. 494. 189 N. W. 407, 193 N. W. 28.
53GL'Herault v. City of Minneapolis, (1897) 69 Minn. 261, 72 N. W. 73.
537Rasmusen v. City of Duluth, (1916) 133 Minn. 134, 157 N. W. 1088.
538Genereau v. City of Duluth, (1915) 131 Minn. 92, 154 N. W. 664.
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no merit because the accident was directly attributable to the
broken, irregular and dangerous condition of the surface of the
walk caused by the wheels of vehicles and the feet of pedes539
trians.
e. Liability to Persons Other Than Travelers.--In some states,
where liability for street defects is purely statutory, it is held that
there is no liability to those who suffer accidents as a result of
street defects when they are using the street for purposes other
than travel. 40 In most other states, however, the duty to keep
streets in repair extends to any persons making a legitimate use
of the street. 541 The question appears not to have been directly
litigated in this state, but the conclusion reached in at least one
case suggests that proof that the injured party was traveling
over the street at the time the accident took place is not essential to recovery. In Barrett v. Village of Princeon,4 2 two sevenyear-old boys were killed by the caving in of a sewer trench which
the village was constructing through the center of one of its principal streets. The boys were playing in the street and the adjacent
court house yard at the time the accident occurred. Although a
dismissal was held proper because of the absence of negligence
on the part of the village, it was said that there is a legitimate
use of streets for recreation and play. Such use is "not at all in
the nature of a trespass" and the municipality owes a duty of due
5 43

care to persons so using them.
5

v. City of St. Paul. (1930) 179 Minn. 553. 230 N. NV. 89.
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928) sec. 2943.
541Ibid.
135 Minn. 56, 160 N. W. 190.
542(1916)
54
3It is fairly common for municipal ordinances to ban playing in the
streets. The effect of such an ordinance on the municipality's duty
to use due care in its maintenance of streets toward those who play in the
streets in violation of the ordinance has never been determined in Minnesota. Elsewhere it has been held that if a person uses a part of the street
for a purnose not intended as a proper use he cannot ordinarily recover.
6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. rev. 1936), see. 2944. On the
other hand, the fact that the injury occurred while the persnn injured %%-as
violating an ordinance does not preclude a recovery unless violation was the
proximate cause of the injury. Idem, sec, 2951. Some cases seem to suggest
that there might be liability in such situations if the defect which caused
the accident would be sufficient to render the street unsafe for those using
486, 88 N. E. 485. 23
it legitimately. Molway v. Chicago, (1909) 239 Ill.
L. R. A. (N.S.) 543. 16 Ann. Cas. 424; Kohlhof v. Chicago, (1901) 192 TIH.
249, 61 N. E. 446, 85 Am. St. Rep. 335. With the conclusion of Barrett v.
Village of Princeton, that recovery is not limited to those using the streets
for purposes of travel, compare Minn. Op. Atty. Gen., 1922, No. 58. in
which the attorney general ruled that where a piece of gravel on a street
was thrown by a wheel of an automobile through a plate glass window,
the village was not liable, not only because there probablv was not negligence, but because the duty to keep streets in safe condition is owed to
travelers only and does not extend to the owner of an abutting building.
39McDonough

5407
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One other case may be pertinent here although the ground of
liability is so obscure that it is difficult to determine where a discussion of the decision properly belongs. This case, Neumann v.
Interstate Power Co.

44

involved an action against a utility com-

pany and the village of Lewiston for wrongful death which occurred when two men were electrocuted when a long pipe they
were lifting touched a 2,300-volt bare electric wire hanging down
with two others to a height of 19 feet in the alley in the rear of
the premises where the men were working. The lack of insulation,
too low elevation of the wires and the lack of adequate warning
were held sufficient to justify the jury in finding the company
negligent and hence liable. Most of the opinion centered around
the company's liability, but in holding the village also liable, the
court said:
"The village cannot as a matter of law be held free of negligence. As already stated, it realized the need of warning. It had
granted the right to the power company to string its wires in the
alley and had knowledge of the way in which they were maintained, the high voltage ones uninsulated. It also knew how
inadequate was the warning the power company had
given. The
4
village was not entitled to judgment non obstante.111

,

It is difficult to understand the basis for holding the village
liable in such a case. If it is because of a violation of its duty to
keep its street in safe condition, the village becomes virtually an
insurer against accidents. 46 It can scarcely be because of a
failure of the village to exercise its police power to see that utility
wires were not a menace to public safety (apart from its duty
to see that its streets were safe for travel) for on that basis the
case could not be reconciled with the accepted principle that no
liability attaches for a failure to pass ordinances or exercise governmental powers. At any rate, if the basis for recovery was a
failure to keep its streets in safe condition, the case must definitely be considered as authority for the proposition that this duty
extends to other persons than travelers, even to those who do not
547
use the surface of the street at all.
544(1929) 179 Minn. 46, 228 N. W. 342.
545(1929) 179 Minn. 46, 51, 228 N. W. 342.
54GCf. Boyd v. City of Duluth, (1914) 126 Minn. 33, 147 N. W. 710. in
which the court held the city not liable for injuries suffered by plaintiff's minor
son when struck by a timber which fell from the supports of the bridge
under which he was playing. The court based its conclusion in that case
on the principle that it was unreasonable to require the city to anticipate
this unusual
occurrence.
54
7The only allusion to this fact was in the court's ruling that the
provision of 2 Mason's Minn. Stat., 1927, sec. 7536, that any power company may use public roads to maintain lines and appurtenances if done in
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f. Contributory Negligence-There is, of course, no difference
in principle between actions against municipal corporations and
those against private individuals so far as the doctrine of contributory negligence is concerned. To the extent that the application of the rule that a plaintiff whose negligence contributes to
his injury cannot recover from a neg'ligent defendant is the same
in the two cases, contributory negligence cases must be considered
beyond the scope of this study. Some of the cases, however,
present unusual applications of the doctrine and are mentioned
here.
The general rule was stated in an early case:
"The question . . . in all cases of negligence, is one of ordinary and reasonable care and caution, such as a prudent man under
like drcumstances would be likely to exercise, having reference
to the degree and kind of danger to be apprehended, and the
means of avoiding it. A greater degree of care would be required
in avoiding an apparently imminent and reasonably certain danger
than one of a less certain, or doubtful, character. Hence the
degree of care necessary to constitute ordinary care in any given
case necessarily depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case; and whenever these facts and circumstances
are fairly open to doubt or controversy..., the question of negligence is one for the jury ....548
In few cases has the court considered the question of contributory negligence one determinable by it as a matter of law;
and because juries appear to have been prone in this state as well
as elsewhere to favor the plaintiff against a public defendant,
most of its decisions on this point have resulted in affirmances
for the plaintiff.
It is not ordinarily conclusive against the plaintiff that he
could have seen the defect had he been on the alert for danger
of that kind. One using the public streets is not required by the
rule of ordinary care to exercise a constant vigilance to discover
or guard against dangers; he may assume that the municipal
corporation has done its duty and that the street is in a safe
5 49
condition for his use.
such a way as not to interfere with the safety and convenience of ordinary
travel along or over them was no defense, since it had no reference to
persons not travelers who were engaged in their own pursuits adjacent to

high voltage lines.
54SErd v. City of St Paul, (1876) 22 Minn. 443, 446.
5 49
Bowen v. City of St. Paul, (1922) 152 Minn. 123, 188 N. IV. 544;

Nichols v. Village of Buhl, (1922) 152 Minn. 494, 189 N. W. 407, 193
N. W. 28; McGandy v. City of Marshall, (1929) 178 Minn. 326. 227 N. W.
177. On the other hand, the municipal corporation may not make the assumption that those who use the streets will not create an unsafe condition in them. See Svendsen v. Village of Alden, (1907) 101 Minn. 158,
112 N. W. 10.
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If number of cases can be taken as any criterion, the most
perplexing problem of contributory negligence in cases of torts
by municipal corporations has been the determination of the circumstances under which previous knowledge by the plaintiff of
a defect precludes his recovery. The general rule stated in the
early case of Kelly v. Southern Minnesota Railway Co.,8 0° may
still serve as a guide:
"The fact that a person attempts to travel on a highway after
he has notice that it is unsafe or out of repair is not necessarily
negligence. This depends on circumstances. He cannot, of course,
heedlessly or recklessly run into danger. But when he knows that
a highway is out of repair, whether he ought absolutely to refrain from attempting to pass over it, or whether he would be
justified in making the attempt, using such a degree of care in
so doing as would be adequate and commensurhte with the condition of the road, is a question of fact to be determined from
all the circumstances of the case. . . . If the risk was such that
men of ordinary prudence having knowledge of the defect would
not under the circumstances have attempted to pass over it at
their own risk, then plaintiff's servant had no right to attempt to
pass it at the risk of the defendant. But if such person would
have believed it reasonably safe to attempt the passage in the
manner adopted by plaintiff's servants in this case, plaintiff could
recover, notwithstanding such previous knowledge of the condition of the crossing."
Since the determination of whether or not the use of a street
with previous knowledge of' a defect constitutes contributory
negligence "depends on circumstances," it is not surprising to
find that in reaching its subjective conclusion, the court has not
always been consistent. The rule that previous knowledge of
an unsafe condition is not conclusive evidence of contributory
negligence was repeated and applied in two cases decided not long
after it was first stated. 5 Then, confronted with a situation
in which it seemed unfair to allow recovery, the court introduced
a modification into the doctrine, holding that if a person with
full and present knowledge of the defective condition of a sidewalk or streets, and of the risks incident to its use, voluntarily
attempts to travel upon it, when the defect could easily, and without appreciable inconvenience, have been avoided by going around
it, he is not in the exercise of reasonable care, but must be presumed to have taken his chances. 552 The earlier cases were dis550(1881) 28 Minn. 98, 9 N. W. 588.
551McKenzie v. City of Northfield, (1883) 30 Minn. 456, 16 N. W.
264; Nichols v. City of Minneapolis, (1885) 33 Minn. 430, 23 N. W. 868.
552Wright v. City of St. Cloud, (1893) 54 Minn. 94, 55 N. W. 819.
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tinguished on the ground that in all of them the traveler either had
no other practicable route, had no previous knowledge of the particular defect, or the accident occurred in the dark and the
traveler, although having previous knowledge of the situation,
did not have presently in mind the existence of the defect or the
consequent risk.
Subsequent decisions have attempted rather to differentiate
Wright v. City of St. Cloud than to follow it. In Malaoy v. City of
St. Paul5 3 the plaintiff was allowed to recover notwithstanding
her previous knowledge of the defect. The Wright Case was distinguished because the defect in the Maloy Case "was not such as
should have turned a prudent traveler .off the walk," the accident
happened in the evening when the snow was falling and the wind
was blowing; vision was obscured and -the hole in the sidewalk
was partially filled with loose snow,: In several cases the court
felt justified in reaching a different conclusion from that reached
in Wright v. St. Cloud on the 'ground that there was no other
way that could be taken without :appreciable inconvenience.A5 '
The fact that the plaintiff knew that, the sidewalk on the opposite
side of the street was in dangerous condition also has been held
to rebut the inference: of contributory, negligence arising from
the use of a sidewalk with knowledge..of a defect in it."' A number..of other cases have, followed -tlie.general principle of the first
case on the subject to the effect thattheuse of a street or sidewalk with previous- knowledge of the defect is not conclusive on
the. question of contributory- .negligence.111 In such a case, the
burden of proving availability of-a safer route is on the defendant

municipal corporation.5 57

-

In at -least two other cases -involving travelers who used a
street with knowledge of its unsafe. condition, the court, following Wrighzt v. City of St. Cloud, has held the plaintiff guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. In Friday v. City of
Moorhead55 1 the plaintiff had driven.-his wagon loaded heavily
with flax down a street sloping from the center to the outside on
553(1893)
54 Minn. 398, 56 N. W. 94. 554
Taylor v. City of Mankato, (1900) 81 Minn. 276, 83 N. W. 1084;"
1-ufnian v. City of Crookston, (1911) 113 Minn. 232, 129 N. NV. 219; MtcDonough
555 v. City of St. Paul, (1930) 179 Minn.,553, 230 N. W. 89.
Burrows v. Village of Lake Crystal, (1895) 61 Minn. 357, 63 N. IV.
."
745. 55
6Murphy v. City of South St. Paul, (1907) 101 Minn. 341, 112 N. IV.
259; Maki v. City of Cloquet, (1911) 116 Minn. 17, 133 N. W. 80; Campion
v. City
557 of Rochester, (1938) 202 Minn. 136, 277 N. W. 422.
Campion v. City of Rochester, .(1938) 202 Minn. 136, 277 N. NV. 422.
558(1901) 84 Minn. 273, 87 N. W.

780.
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an occasion when the street was covered with ice. The wagon
slipped to the side, hit the curb, turned over, and the plaintiff
was injured. Testimony showed that plaintiff knew of the condition of the street and that he could have gone on another street
with safety. The court said the plaintiff must be deemed, as a
matter of law, to have assumed the risks incident to passing over
the icy street.
This decision was followed a short time later in Johnson v.
City of Willmar,"O involving somewhat different circumstances.
There the plaintiff had removed certain tile, planks and debris
left by a contractor on the side of a tile ditch and had piled it
along the curb in order to get in and out of his stable. This
left a driveway ten or twelve feet wide next to the ditch. The
plaintiff drove his team and buggy up this driveway at night and
the right wheel of the buggy grated against a large stone, startling
one of the horses as a result of which both fell into the ditch.
Here again the plaintiff was held negligent as a matter of law.
The court concluded that the decision in Friday v. City of Moorhead governed this case. The fact that there the driver might
have traveled on another street to reach his destination was held
not a significant difference between the two cases.
One point of inconsistency in these cases involving use of a
street with prior knowledge of a defect, perhaps more verbal
than real, may be found in the court's statement of the standard
of care required of the plaintiff in view of his previous knowledge. Generally it has been said that the standard is still that
of ordinary care in view of all the circumstances, one of the
circumstances being plaintiff's familiarity with the defect;"'0
but in one case the court may have looked with approval on a
charge that if the plaintiff knew that the sidewalk was in a dangerous condition it was her duty, in passing over it, to use more
than ordinary care and caution to avoid injuryA01 The case cannot be considered of any real significance on that point, however,
because, since the defendant village was appealing the case, the
charge was as favorable to it as it could have wished.
It is not negligence per se for a pedestrian to cross a street
at places other than intersections. The city owes a duty to keep
the streets as well as the sidewalks and crossings safe for pedes559(1910) 111 Minn. 58, 126 N. W. 397.

500Lyons v. City of Red 'Wing. (1899)

76 Minn. 20, 78 N. W. 868:

Taylor1 v. City of Mankato, (1900) 81 Minn. 276, 83 N. W. 1084.
56Holm v. Village of Carver, (1893) 55 Minn. 199, 56 N. W. 826.
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trians. Consequently a pedestrian who.is injured as a result of a
street defect is not precluded from recovery simply because he
02
crossed the street in the miiddle of a block.
Several other cases illustrate the application of contributory
negligence doctrines to actions resulting from street and sidewalk
defects. In Anderson v. City of St. Cloud"63 the plaintiff was
hauling a-nine-ton granite block by teams across a city bridge
when the wheels on one side broke through the plank flooring,
the stone slipped from place, fell into the river below and was
practically ruined. The plaintiff had investigated the capacity
of the bridge before using it, and the teamsters proceeded 400
feet over it after the planking commenced to crack; the wagon
could have been turned over to the other side of the bridge where
the flooring was stronger. Under these circumstances the plaintiff
was held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law
since the result might have been obviously expected and avoided
by reasonable care.
In Hudon v. City of Little Falls,564 the plaintiff was held
precluded from recovery because, in walking along the edge of
a wooden sidewalk beyond the stringers as a result of which a loose
board tipped up and injured him, "he must have been using the
sidewalk as a plaything, or as an instrument by which to test his
skill in walking on dangerous projections and in difficult places."
The evidence disclosed that he had noticed before that the plank
was loose, so the case probably falls within the principle of
Wright v. City of St. Cloud,"5 and Friday v. City of Moorhead.16
5 7
involved an accident in a
Stoker v. City of Minneapolis1
street which had been graded up with sand later washed out by
water used in extinguishing a fire near the scene of the accident.
The plaintiff was crossing the street in the dark and came to the
ditch created by the washout. She tried the planks crossing it
but, being heavy, thought they would not hold her weight; so she
walked a few steps along the side of the ditch until the bank
gave way and injured her. She had no previous knowledge of the
condition of the street. The court held that on the question of
contributory negligence the evidence made the case a close one
562Collins v. Dodge, (1887) 37 Minn. 503, 35 N. NV. 368; Thorscll v.
City of Virginia, (1917) 138 Minn. 55, 163 N. W. 976.
563(1900) 79 Miinn. 88, 81 N. XV. 746.
54(1897) 68 Minn. 463, 71 N. W. 678.
565(1893) 54 Minn. 94, 55 N. W. 819.
560(1901) 84 Minn. 273, 87 N. W. 780.
567(1884) 32 Minn. 478, 21 N. W. 557.
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but decided that different minds might reasonably arrive at different conclusions and that the case was properly left to the jury,
which had found for the plaintiff.
g. Notice of Defect.-If a street or sidewalk is properly
constructed in the first instance, the city or village is not liable
for damages suffered as a result of defects which develop in the
street or sidewalk unless its officers had actual notice of the
defect or unless it is proved that the defect existed for such a
length of time that the city authorities, if exercising reasonable
diligence or supervision, would or should have discovered it.o8
In other words, the city must have "actual" or "constructive"
notice.509 No notice need be proved, however, where the defective condition of the street is directly caused by the officers or
employees of the municipal corporation." 0 Perhaps this is not
so much an exception to the requirement of notice as an application of it, since the city must be presumed to have notice of that
which it itself does.
Actual notice means notice to an officer or employee of the
municipality, since a city can act only through agents; but notice
to any officer or employee does not necessarily constitute actual
notice. Because of the general powers and duties of the mayor
as chief magistrate of the city, it has been held that notice to
him is actual notice to the city.5 ' In Minneapolis, the mayor had
control of the police under charter, and a rule for many years required the police to report street defects. A report of a defect
in a street was made to a policeman but was not acted upon
before an accident occurred as a result of the defect. In a case
arising out of the accident,5 72 it was contended that the mayor
could not impose the duty of reporting street defects on policemen, but the court said, after citing the Cunningham Case,
"This may not be very important in this case except as it
indicates that notice may be good though not given to one charged
by the council with any duty respecting streets. . . .As modem
8
56 Miller

v. City of St. Paul, (1888) 38 Minn. 134, 36 N. W. 271.
The principle has been stated in numerous cases, many of which are cited
subsequently
in this discussion.
569
245 (Gil. 204).
570See Lindholm v. City of St. Paul, (1872) 19 Minn.
McDonald v. City of Duluth, (1904) 93 Minn. 206, 100 N. W. 1102;

Kleopfert v. City of Minneapolis, (1904) 93 Minn. 118, 100 N. W. 669;

Ogren v. City of Minneapolis, (1913) 121 Minn. 243, 141 N. W. 120. The
rule had been stated as dictum in Cleveland v. City of St. Paul, (1871)
18 Minn.
279 (Gil. 255).
571
Cunningham v. City of Thief River Falls, (1901) 84 Minn. 21, 86

763.
N. W.
572

Engel v. City of Minneapolis, (1917) 138 Minn. 438, 165 N. W. 278.
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cities are constituted and managed, it'is important that there be
some quick and ready means of discovering defects in streets and
some one in authority to whom such defects may be expeditiously
reported. This seems to be a very appropriate function to impose
on the police department, and we are of the opinion that the
mayor as chief magistrate of the city, having 'control and supervision of its police force' may very properly be regarded as vested
with power to impose this duty upon the police by rules and
regulations looking to that end. In fact, where, as in this case,
such rules have been in force and have been notoriously acted
upon for 30 years, they must be deemed to have the sanction and
approval of every branch of the city government." 8"
7
The case of Engel v. City of MinneapolWS
4 is authority for
the proposition that notice of defect in a street to an officer or
agent of the city is notice to the city if the officer is charged
with the duty of repairing the defect or reporting it to another
officer or department which is to make repairs.
In actual effect there is so little difference between express
and constructive notice that a plaintiff has been permitted to
prove constructive notice on an allegation of actual notice. "Constructive notice is included within actual notice, and in a case
of this kind is sufficient under a pleading charging the latter.
In other words the greater includes the less.""75
When constructive notice is relied upon, the nature and extent of the use of the walk and the length of time the defect has
existed become important. As in so many phases of the law of
negligence, no rule of thumb can determine when there has been
constructive notice; each case must depend on its own facts. As
the court once put it:
"We cannot lay down any rule to determine the time a defect
must continue to constitute such notice that will be absolute.
The negligence of a municipality in allowing defects in sidewalks to continue is relative, and, of necessity, its location, the
extent to which it is travelled; its appearance, suggesting the
probable discovery of the defect; and the difficulty or ease with
which its imperfections will be remedied by the authorities charged
with the duty to repair,--are essential, and affect this question." 78
573(1917) 138 Minn. 438, 440, 165 N. W. 278. Earlier the court in a
St. Paul case had left undecided the question whether the fact that day
and night police officers were aware of the obstruction in the street, would,
under all the circumstances of that case, constitute actual notice of the

defect to the city. Cleveland v. City of St. Paul, (1871) 18 Minn. 279 (Gil.
255).
574(1917) 138 Minn. 438, 165 N. W. 278.
5
75Maki v. City of Cloquet, (1911) 116 Minn. 17, 18; 133 N. W. 80.
5
7GLundberg v. Village of North Mankato, (1902) 87 Minn. 484, 485.
92 N. NV. 401.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

The duty to keep sfiFees in repair includes the duty to find
out when they are in disrepair. It is for this reason that proof of
the existence of a defect for a considerable period of time is
competent since it tends to show negligence. 5"
By and large it is up to the jury to determine whether or not
the defect existed for such a time as to charge the defendant
with constructive notice. In very few cases has the court felt
justified in saying that as a matter of law the city did not have
notice. The existence of a defect for several years, of course, constitutes constructive notice;578 and it has been held that where
no witness knew how long a particular defect had been in existence, one witness testifying that the walk looked as if it had
been in the same condition for several years, the street foreman
saying that he did not know, the jury was justified in concluding that it had existed long enough to charge the city with
notice. 75 But far shorter times have been held sufficient. Two
582
58
and twenty dayso88
months,58 ' several weeks, ' one month,
have been held long enough to justify a jury in finding constructive notice. In one case the court sanctioned an instruction that
if the jury found that the defect in question was open, notorious,
and dangerous and existed from December 20th to January 31st,
it would be presumed that the city had notice. 84 Two or three
weeks, 85 ten days or two weeks,5 80 and one to two weeks " 8 have
been held long enough for a defect to exist to justify the jury in
imputing constructive notice to the city; and the existence of a
defect for eight days in one case "amply justified" a finding of
negligence. 588 That an obstruction was left unguarded for several
nights has been held sufficient to make notice a question for the
jury. 58 9 Perhaps the shortest time which it has been held might
57Gude
v. City of Mankato, (1883) 30 Minn. 256, 15 N. W. 175.
5
7SMaki v. City of Cloquet, (1911) 116 Minn. 17, 133 N. W. 80.
5
79Brandt v. City of Duluth, (1924) 158 Minn. 104, 196 N. W. 932.
580
Tabor v. City of St. Paul, (1886) 36 Minn. 188, 30 N. W. 765;
see also Moore v. City of Minneapolis, (1872) 19 Minn. 300; Weide v.
St. Paul, (1914) 126 Minn. 491, 148 N. W. 304.
City of
8
5582
'Waldron v. City of St. Paul, (1885) 33 Minn. 87, 22 N. W. 4.
Baker v. City of South St. Paul, (1938) 202 Minn. 491, 279

N. W.8 211.
5 3Ljundberg v. Village of North Mankato, (1902) 87 Minn. 484, 485;
92 N. W. 401.
584Dory v. City of Duluth, (1908) 103 Minn. 154, 114 N. W. 465.
585Boyd v. City of Duluth, (1925) 164 Minn. 19, 204 N. W. 562.
58OCallahan v. City of Duluth, (1936) 197 Minn. 403, 267 N. W. 361.
588 Mathieson v. City of Duluth, (1937) 201 Minn. 290, 276 N. W. 222.

58SNichols v. City of Minneapolis, (1885) 33 Minn. 430, 23 N. W. 868.
589

Killeen v. City of St. Paul, (1917) 136 Minn. 66, 161 N. W. 260.
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constitute notice is nine hours. In Stellwagon v. City of Winona"10
the court concluded that under the circumstances it was a question for the jury whether the failure of the city to discover and
remedy a defective iron grating over a coal hole on a much
traveled street for nine hours was negligence.
Whether or not the city might be held to have constructive
notice of a newly-formed patch of ice because such patches had
formed at the same spot for a long period of time was an open
question in this state until recently. At least one case had intimated that this might be sufficient on which to predicate constructive notice. In Stanke v. City of St. Pau4,"9 an action arising out of a fall on a piece of ice formed on a sidewalk because
a gutter became obstructed and overflowed the sidewalk, the court
said that in the absence of notice, actual or constructive, to the
municipality, that ice usually formed at that place, or at least,
in the absence of notice that ice might so form and cause the walk
to become dangerous, the plaintiff could not recover. Relying
on dicta to this effect, the plaintiff in a later case sought to introduce evidence that the ice patch on which he fell, formed from
water dripping from a building cornice, was similar to others
which had formed at the same spot regularly for a number of
years, thus proving constructive notice. However, the court said
that since the particular patch of ice which caused the accident
apparently had been in existence for only a few hours, a city
could not be said to have constructive notice in such circumstances. If the plaintiff's theory were to be followed, the court
reasoned, every city would be liable in hundreds of similar cases.
The rule of constructive notice, in the court's judgment, could
not be extended this far.?92 This decision was later followed in a
case involving a patch of ice which was in existence in the afternoon of the day of the accident but not the same morning.
It will be seen from the foregoing review of the Minnesota
cases that no general rule can be deduced as to the length of
time required to give the city implied notice of a defective condition in its streets. A few hours normally cannot be considered
enough, but under some circumstances on a heavily traveled
street, anything more than a few hours may make the question
one for the jury. The court is much more likely to say as a mat590(1893) 54 Minn. 460, 56 N. W. 51.
591(1898) 71 Minn. 51, 73 N. W. 629.
59 2
Mesberg v. City of Duluth, (1934) 191 Minn. 393, 254 N. W. 597.
593
johnson v. City of Redwood Falls, (1938) 204 Minn. 115, 282 N. W.
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ter of law that the city had constructive notice than that it had
not.
Since wooden sidewalks are bound to decay and since this
decay takes a considerable period of time, the mere fact that such
a sidewalk is rotten in such a way that the defect could have been
discovered by inspection may be sufficient to charge the city with
constructive notice. 5 4 In the nature of things, the process of
decay must have continued for so great a length of time that the
city is chargeable with notice of it; at least the question of negligence in such a case is for the jury. 95 Since decay is a gradual
process, it is competent to show that a sidewalk was in bad condition some time after the accident when a worn-out and rotten
condition of the sidewalk is relied on as the cause of the accident.""
At least for the purpose of proving notice to the city, evidence that prior to the plaintiff's injury other similar accidents
had occurred to other pedestrians at the same place because of a
defect in the sidewalk has been held admissible. 0 The court
commented, however:
"Wagon wheels, locomotive wheels, and other machinery act
with more uniformity and certainty than do different people's
legs, and whether such experiments with the latter are competent
to prove the existence of a defect in a sidewalk we need not
decide."
Evidently it may not be necessary in some cases for a city
to have notice of a particular defect if it knows of a general de98
a confective condition. In Hufiman v. City of Crookston,"
tractor constructing a bridge had placed a plank across the walk,
as a result of which the plaintiff claimed to have been injured. The
city officials knew for some time prior to the accident that the
street and sidewalk at this point were being obstructed by the
company. The court held that since the city authorities were
informed generally of obstructions to travel although they had
no notice of the particular plank and made no effort to prevent
the obstruction, the question of their negligence was for the jury.
594

Peterson v. Village of Cokato, (1901) 84 Minn. 205, 87 N. W. 615;
Ritschdorf
v. City of St. Paul, (1905) 95 Mim. 370, 104 N. W. 129.
595Murphy v. City of South St. Paul, (1907) 101 Minn. 341, 112
N. W. 259; Estabrook v. City of Duluth, (1919) 142 Minn. 318, 172 N. W.
123. 5 8
1 johnson v. City of St. Paul, (1893) 52 Minn. 364, 54 N. W. 735.
59
-Burrows v. Village of Lake Crystal, (1895) 61 Minn. 357, 63
N. W. 745.
598(1911) 113 Minn. 232, 129 N. W. 219.
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On the other hand, knowledge of another defect near the place
of the accident would not be constructive notice if it were not
of such a character as to put the. city on guard against the defect
which caused the accident. For example, in Baker v. City of South
59 9
where the plaintiff was injured when an automobile
St. Paul,

in which she was riding struck a hole in the street caused by a
leak in a sewer, there was evidence that there had been a previous
break in or near the same place, which the city repaired. The court
held, however, that the evidence as it stood was not sufficient
to show that these two holes were caused by breaks in the same
tile line and hence that the city could not be charged with constructive notice. It was intimated that had there been proof that
the earlier break was in the same line, the city would have had
constructive notice.
The rule that constructive notice may be inferred from the
existence of a defect for some time assumes a requirement that
the municipal corporation must use reasonable care to ascertain
that an unsafe condition exists. As to the necessity for inspection which this requirement suggests, the court has found it impossible to establish any general rule. In one case the defendant
asked an instruction to the effect that inspection of sidewalks
once in two weeks followed by repairs found necessary as a result of the inspection was reasonable diligence. In holding that
this instruction was properly refused, the court said that no
inflexible rule could be laid dovn in such case.
"The conditions are liable to be so different in relation to different walks, or different portions of the same walk, and so many
contingencies are likely to arise, that it can only be determined
from the situation and circumstances of each case whether reason.
able care has been exercised in the premises."8 00
Since constructive notice cannot be considered as commencing
from any particular moment, the question of whether or not there
was time to make repairs after notice was given cannot arise in
such a case; but this conceivably may be an important element
of the case where actual notice is relied on. Certainly the municipal
corporation cannot be held negligent if actual notice is given to
its officials in charge of street repair but injury occurs as a result
of the defect before it is physically possible to get street crews
to the scene. This point has not been raised in the cases as often
599 (1936) 198 Minn. 437, 270 N. W. 154.
OOKellogg v. Village of Janesville, (1885) 34 Minn. 132, 24 N. W.
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as might be expected. Apparently only a short time is necessary
after notice when the city is chargeable with negligence for failure
to make repairs. In one case five and a half hours elapsed between
the time when notice was made to a police officer and the time
the accident occurred. While the case turned on the question of
whether this was notice to the city, there was no suggestion that
the shortness of the time between notice and the injury would
have taken the question from the jury as a matter of law. 01
h. Liability of Abutting Landowners.-The municipal corporation, because of its obligation to keep its streets and sidewalks
in a safe condition for travel, is liable for its neglect in performing that duty regardless of the source of the defect; and frequently it is joined as defendant with an abutting landowner who
has caused the unsafe condition. 02 The landowner's liability is
not, however, so extensive as the city's. He is liable where the
defect is the result of his affirmative misconduct,003 and he is liable
also for mere neglect in caring for such things as coal holes,
vaults, and passageways which he has placed in the sidewalk for
his own convenience. 60 4 Most of the cases involve things of this
character erected by the landowner to provide access to his basement for goods or persons; but in Williams v. Stes,003 the rule
was applied to a case of an injury resulting from tripping over
a sidewalk made uneven when the defendant razed an adjoining
building and removed the material supporting the sidewalk so
that it sagged. The same principle has been held to impose liability on a property owner who allowed a drain pipe on his
premises to become clogged, as a result of which water ran on
the walk until it formed a mound of ice on which plaintiff fell. 00
When something like a trap door or manhole is placed in
OlEngel v. City of Minneapolis, (1917) 138 Minn. 438, 165 N. W. 278.
o 2See, for example, L'Herault v. City of Minneapolis, (1897) 69
Minn. 261, 72 N. W. 73; Fortmeyer v. National Biscuit Co., (1911) 116
Minn. 158, 133 N. W. 461; Latell v. Cunningham, (1913) 122 Minn. 144,
142 N. W. 141; Williams v. Stees, (1927) 172 Minn. 35, 214 N. W. 671.
6O3See, for example, Fortmeyer v. National Biscuit Co.. (1911) 116
Minn. 158, 133 N. W. 461; and Williams v. Stees, (1927) 172 Minn. 35,
214 N. W. 671.
Oo4Landru v. Lund, (1888) 38 Minn. 538, 38 N. AV. 621; City of
Wabasha v. Southworth, (1893) 54 Minn. 79, 55 N. W. 818; Ray v. Jones
& Adams Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 101, 99 N. W. 782; Latell v. Cunningham,
(1913) 122 Minn. 144. 142 N. W. 141; Williams v. Stees, (1927) 172 Minn.
35. 214 N. W. 671. See Kooreny v. Dampier-Baird Mortuary, Inc., (1940)
207 Minn. 367, 291 N. W. 611.

o5(1927) 172 Minn. 34, 214 N. W. 671.

6ooJohnson v. Elmhorg, (1925)

165 Minn. 67, 205 N. W. 628. See also

Isham v. Broderick, (1903) 89 Minn. 397, 95 N. W. 224.
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a sidewalk for the convenience of the abutting owner, as between
the owner and the city, the duty of maintaining it in safe condition devolves upon the owner. He cannot relieve himself of this
duty merely by abandoning the use of the structure but can do
so only through its removal and the restoration of the sidewalk
to its original condition. G0 7 If the structure becomes unsafe through
the negligence of the property owner and injury results for which
the city is liable because of the neglect of its duty to keep its
streets safe for travel, it may, upon payment of damages to the
persons injured, recover from the owner. The city need not wait
G0
for a suit before paying the damages.
While lot owners are liable for injuries resulting from a
defective condition which they themselves have created, they
are not liable to pedestrians for injuries sustained as a result of
slipping on ridges or hummocks of snow and ice which form from
natural causes on adjacent sidewalks.0 09 The court has even allowed a recovery from the city for an injury sustained by slipping
on an icy sidewalk in front of premises of the injured woman's
husband. 610 Possibly the owner himself might be barred from
recovery on the ground that he was contributorily negligent, particularly where, as in the case just mentioned, an ordinance
imposed the duty of keeping the sidewalk free of snow and ice
on the occupant of the abutting property.1 1 But even though
owners are assessed for sidewalks and street paving, they are not
obliged to keep the street free from snow and ice.012
That there is a driveway over the sidewalk into the abutting
premises does not change the obligations of the abutting owner;
he is no more required to keep the driveway clear of snow or ice
than the part of the sidewalk where there is no driveway.0 13 The
fact that ruts are caused solely by the traffic coming into his
premises does not make him liable under the rule that an abutting
60City of Wabasha v. Southworth, (1893) 54 Minn. 79, 55 N. IV.
818.

60sIbid.

60 9Noonan v. City of Stillwater, (1885) 33 Minn. 193, 22 N. IV. 444;
Burke v. O'Neil, (1934) 192 Minn. 492, 257 N. W. 81; Abar v. Ramsey

Motor Service, Inc.. (1935) 195 Minn. 597, 263 N. W. 917. The city would
be subject to liability in such case, assuming actual or constructive notice.
See supra, pp. 507-511.
61ONiemi v. Village of Hibbing, (1928) 175 Minn. 366, 221 N. NV. 241.
611Cf. Hendershott v. City of Grand Rapids, (1905) 142 Mich. 140,
105 N. W. 140; Avery v. City of Syracuse, (1883) 29 Hun (N.Y.) 537.
612
Burke v. O'Neil, (1934) 192 Minn. 492, 257 N. W. 81.
613Abar v. Ramsey Motor Service, Inc. (1935) 195 Minn. 597, 263
N. W. 917.
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owner is liable for the negligent maintenance of0 14
an object maintained in the sidewalk for his own convenience.
Since the landowner's fee extends to the center of the street
subject only to the public easement and he may make use of his
property for a purpose compatible with the free use of the public, he is not liable to persons injured simply because he builds
a retaining wall extending into the dedicated portion of the street
when the portion occupied by the wall is not needed or used for
sidewalk or street purposes. 15
A contractor who builds a temporary sidewalk while erecting
a building is liable to the same extent-and only to the same
extent-as an abutting property owner. He is not responsible,
therefore, for injuries caused by stumbling and falling on accumulations of snow and ice deposited on the temporary walk by
the elements and then trampled into ridges and irregularities by
passing pedestrians. 10
Not only is an abutter not liable for defects on the sidewalk
created by natural causes, but he is also not answerable for injuries resulting from an unsafe condition created by the acts of
third persons. An unusual case of this kind is O'Hara v. Morris
Fruit and Produce Co. 17 The injury which gave rise to that
action occurred when the plaintiff got her foot entangled in a
cap which either fell off or was thrown by a customer of the
defendant unloading a truckload of crated eggs in front of the
defendant's premises. Officials and employees noticed the cap but
did not remove it. The accident occurred fifteen minutes later.
In directing the entry of judgment for the defendant, the court
said that "the defendant owed no duty to travelers to remove
from the sidewalk in front of its place of business matters in the
nature of obstructions to safe passage or a nuisance if the same
were not placed there or created by it or its servants." Exemption has also been extended to the owner of a building for damages
179 Minn. 553, 230
6l4See McDonough v. City of St. Paul, (1930)
N. W. 89.
615Kooreny v. Dampier-Baird Mortuary, Inc. (1940) 207 Minn. 367,
291 N. W. 611. "The sidewalk and the remainder of the street are equally
for public use,-the rights of the public are the same in each. The rights

as far as the center of the street, of the owner of an abutting lot, are the

same in each. That one is reserved for passers on foot, and the other is

for the use of vehicles, is only a regulation of the public use for the public

good, the public authorities determining how much shall be reserved for
sidewalk." Noonan v. City of Stillwater, (1885) 33 Minn. 198, 200, 22
N. W. 444, 445, 53 Am. Rep. 23.
61OBoecher v. City of St. Paul, (1921) 149 Minn. 69, 182 N. W. 908.
017(1938) 203 Minn. 541, 282 N. W. 274.
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resulting from the removal of a coal hole cover in the sidewalk
by coal men while the premises were in the possession of his
tenant.6 18
Where a property owner constructs a private sidewalk outside the street lines and holds it out as a thoroughfare to the
public, he must use ordinary care in keeping it in proper condition. 619 Apparently he has the same duties here as the city has
-with respect to city sidewalks.020
i. Liability of Other Persons Causing Defects.--One who
negligently creates a danger to a traveler on a public street may
be liable for the consequences regardless of whether or not he
owns or occupies the abutting property. 211Thus a contractor who
fails to erect proper barriers in the street when he makes an
excavation or piles building materials there has been held liable
to someone injured as a result of his negligence. 02 2 Of course, the
fact that the contractor is primarily responsible does not relieve
the municipal corporation of liability if it had actual or constructive notice of the unsafe condition of the street.02 On the same
principle the court has held liable one who leaves a coal hole
in a sidewalk open and unguarded.6 2 4 One who has a guy wire
strung across the street and attached to a derrick has been held
responsible for injuries resulting.025 That the custom among
other contractors is to take no more precautions against injuries
from excavations has been held incompetent evidence. A failure
to erect barriers was held in that case negligence as a matter of
law.

62 6

618

Korte v. St. Paul Trust'Co., (1893) 54 Ifinn. 530. 56 N. W. 246.
Marsh v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 182, 99 N. W.

61 9

630.

620Cf. Burke v. O'Neil, (1934) 192 Minn. 492, 257 N. W. 81, where
an apartment owner was held not liable for damages occurring to the
plaintiff when she slipped on an icy sidewalk constructed by the defendant
across a boulevard between a city sidewalk and the curb. The slipperiness
was caused by water flowing over the sidewalk as a result of the clogging
of a catch basin some little distance away.

v. Stees, (1927) 172 Minn. 35, 214 N. AV. 671.
621Williams
622
Nye v. Dibley, (1903) 88 Minn. 465, 93 N. IV. 524; Hufman v.

City of Crookston, (1911)

113 Minn. 232, 129 N. W,. 219; Empey v.

Lovell, (1912) 117 Minn. 520. 134 N. XV. 289; Hoffman v. City of St.
Paul, 2 (1932) 187 Minn. 320, 245 N. V. 373.
6 Klleen v. City of St. Cloud, (1917) 136 Minn. 66. 161 N. AV. 260;

see also Grant v. City of Stillwater, (1886) 35 Mfinn. 242. 28 N. W. 660;

Moore v. Townsend, (1895) 76 fim. 64. 78 N. V. 880; Hoffman v. City
of St
624Paul, (1932) 187 Minn. 320, 245 N. AV. 373.
Ray v. Jones and Adams Co., (1904) 92 Mf inn. 101, 99 N. AV. 782;
see also Waters v. Pioneer Fuel Co., (1893) 52 Minn. 474, 55 N. W. 52,

38 Am.
625 St. Rep. 564.
Larson v. Ring, (1890) 43 Minn. 88, 44 N. W. 1078.
6 26
Empey v. Lovell, (1912) 117 Minn. 520, 134 N. W. 289.
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j. Efforts of Municipal Corporationto Shift Responsibility.In Boecher v. City of St. Paul,627 a contractor erecting a building was granted a permit by the city to maintain a temporary
wooden sidewalk in the street next to which the building was
being constructed. After a snowstorm when a hummock of ice
and snow was formed, the plaintiff slipped on the snow and was
injured. The permit contained a clause under which the contractor agreed to maintain a clear walk four feet wide and to
save the city harmless for any damages sustained as a result of
the walk's maintenance. These conditions were accepted. The
plaintiff recovered a verdict against the depot company and the
contractor, but the court subsequently rendered judgment in their
favor notwithstanding the verdict. In affirming this judgment on
appeal, the court relied on the rule that lot owners are not liable
to pedestrians for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions
in the walk abutting their property unless they created the
dangerous condition. The court concluded that under such circumstances the law imposed on a contractor or builder no other or
greater responsibility in respect to such temporary passageways
than it imposes on an adjacent property owner in respect to a
permanent sidewalk. Two justices dissented, however, on the
ground that the contractors accepted the regulatory control imposed by the city and were bound by it. The defect complained of
was the result of negligence in the failure of the defendants to
maintain the substitute walk in safe repair for public use as they
had agreed to do.
The decision in the Boecher Case may be contrasted with that
in City of St. Paul v. St. Paul City Railway Co., 0 28 decided some
seventeen years earlier. The latter case involved an action to
recover the amount of a judgment obtained against the city for an
injury received by the driver of a carriage on a bridge due to
an alleged defect in the portion of the bridge occupied by the
street car company. The ordinance authorizing the company to
operate the car line over this bridge contained a clause binding
the company to indemnify the city for all damages recovered or
arising out of the passage of the ordinance. In holding for the
plaintiff city, the court said that the obligations were contractual,
for the failure to repair, to the extent of the amount of the judgment recovered.
627(1921) 149 Minn. 69, 182 N. W. 908.
628(1904) 92 Minn. 516, 100 N. W. 472.
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"The street car company had adapted itself in its use of the
streets, to the conditions imposed by the city, and, under the
clear terms of the provisions of the ordinance referred to, was
bound to keep the place of the accident in repair."
It may be possible to distinguish the facts of Botcher v.
City of St. Paul from those of City of St. Paid v. St. Paid City
Ry. Co. on the ground that in the former case the rights of the

city against the permittee were not involved; but that point does
not appear to be crucial in the decision of the case. So far as the
language of the opinion is concerned, there is nothing to suggest
that the result would not have been the same had the suit been
one by the city against the depot company.629 If this is implied
in the decision, however, the principle seems difficult to defend.
Why one whose use of a sidewalk for his own purposes necessitates the construction of a temporary passageway for pedestrians
should be able to escape a burden which its use by the public
automatically imposes upon the city is not easy to comprehend,
particularly when, as in most cases of this kind, the city would
be unable to use the ordinary means at its disposal to plow it
free of snow and ice. The city should not be relieved from liability to the injured pedestrian in such cases any more than in
the usual instances of snow and ice ridges on sidewalks; but the
relation of the permittee to the city is quite another matter.30
629The jury apparently found for the city in the Boecher Case, but
the defect complained of was the kind of ice and snow accumulation which
may subject a city to liability if the failure to remove it constitutes negligence.
630
Compare Baumgartner v. City of Mankato, (1895) 60 Minn. 244,
62 N. W. 127, where the street railway company was held liable for an
injury resulting from a defect in the portion of the street which it agreed
by franchise to maintain. It was conceded by the court that when a city
grants to a private corporation the right to use part of a street, it may
attach to the grant a condition that a portion of the street adjacent to the
tracks should be maintained by the franchise holder accepting such grant
and enjoying its benefits. The Ivo cases are not entirely parallel, since the
defect in the Mankato case was one which might possibly have subjected the
company to liability irrespective of the agreement; however, the court
dearly based its decision on the violation of the duty to maintain which

had been assumed by the corporation in the franchise ordinance. If a cor-

poration granted a right to use a street may be required to assume the
obligation assumed in the Mankato case, it is difficult to see why it may
not be compelled in accepting the grant to assume the somewhat different
one assumed in the St Paul case. The type of privilege granted in the
two cases should make no difference, and recovery by an injured third
person should be permitted as much in one case as in the other. Cf. the
recent case of La Mourea v. Rhude, (1940) 209 Minn. 53, 295 N. NV.
304, where it was held that a person whose property was injured by
blasting in connection with sewer construction could sue the sewer contractor directly when the contract with the city made the contractor "liable
for any damages done to the work or other structure or public or private
property and injuries sustained by persons" in the construction of the sewer.
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While it may be possible to impose liability on one who secures a franchise for the use of the streets for injuries resulting
from the unsafe condition of the streets due to the negligence of
the franchise holder, the municipal responsibility to travelers
probably cannot be shifted by franchise. 3 ' Mere permission to a
street railway company to lay tracks along its streets does not
relieve the municipal corporation of liability. "2
It is firmly established that the city cannot shift its responsibility to the abutting owner either by charter 33 or by ordinance. 3 4 In an action against the abutting owner by a pedestrian
injured by an object on the sidewalk, the plaintiff introduced
an ordinance prohibiting any person from placing or dropping
any material or substance on any street or sidewalk. On appeal
the supreme court found that the ordinance had been improperly
introduced because
"It is clear that this ordinance is directed against the transgressor, and not against the owner or occupier of abutting property who neither by his own act or omission nor by that of his
servants violates the ordinance. The city and not the owners or
tenants of premises abutting public sidewalks is responsible for
the latter's safe condition for travel. It cannot shift this responsibility to the shoulders of others by ordinance." 8'
The possible effect of a city ordinance in relieving the person creating an unsafe condition of the streets from liability for
injuries resulting from it was involved in Larson v. Ring.ag
There the defendant had strung a guy wire across a street and
attached it to a derrick and the plaintiff was injured by it when
traveling down the street in a wagon. At the trial a Minneapolis
ordinance was introduced which contained provisions authorizing the placing of guy lines at least ten feet above the streets
opposite a derrick. The ordinance was held improperly received
since undisputed evidence showed that there was no attempt to
comply with it, the ordinance being introduced solely in an
attempt to show what the city considered safe. Of more general
interest was this statement of the court:
"The city authorities could not absolve the city nor could
they release the contractors from the charge of negligence, if
G3-See the cases cited in 7 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed.
1928) 32 sec. 2915.
633Campbell v. City of Stillwater, (1884) 32 Minn. 308, 20 N. W. 320.

63 Noonan v. City of Stillwater, (1885) 33 Minn. 198, 22 N. W. 444.

6 4See O'Hara v. Morris Fruit and Produce Co., (1938) 203 Minn.
541, 282 N. W. 274.
635(1938) 203 Minn. 541, 542, 282 N. W. 274.
686(1890) 43 Minn. 88, 44 N. W. 1078.
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the guy rope was not put high enough. A grant of power and
privileges by a city council to do certain things does not carry
with it any immunity for private injuries which may result
direct'037
ly from the exercise of such powers and privileges.
k. Construction of Streets and Other Public Works.-An application of the distinction between discretionary and ministerial
acts is found in the rule, generally applied throughout the country, that a municipal corporation is not liable for a defective plan
for the construction of streets or other public works but it is
liable for the defective execution of that plan.0 38 However, this
principle has been so qualified in this state, as in some others,
that it might better be frankly abandoned. It was early held that
a direct invasion of property was not excused by the fact that
it necessarily resulted from the plan adopted,0 30 a limitation very
sweeping in its effect in the case of sewers. Other cases justify
the conclusion that the rule actually applied is not so much one
distinguishing between defective plans and defective execution
of a plan as it is one of reasonableness."01 It has been said that
there is no liability for injuries from defects in the plans for
public work because in most cases it would be unreasonable to
impose liability in such cases. On the other hand a reasonable
man would not permit defects in the execution of the plan;
therefore, it can generally be said that liability is imposed for
defects resulting from the negligent execution of a plan. Several
cases, suggest that the court has supplanted the usually-recognized
distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts with a rule
of reason. In Conlon v. City of St. Paul4 the defendant was
held not liable for an injury suffered by plaintiff when she slipped
and fell on a sloping sidewalk. The court said that if reasonable
minds might differ as to whether the plan a'dopted or some other
plan is the better, the decision of the city authorities on the question is conclusive and cannot be reviewed by the courts, but if in
adopting the plan, there is such a gross error of judgment as to
show that in fact no intelligent judgment at all was ever exercised,
637(1890) 43 Minn. 88, 44 N. W. 1078.
638

McClure v. City of Red Wing, (1881) 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. V. 767;

White, Negligence of Municipal Corporations (1920), 47, sec. 31; 6
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. rev. 1939) sec. 2804; McQuillin,
Liability of Municipal Corporations for Damages Resulting from Defective
Plans639of Construction, (1900) 51 Cent. L. J. 185-190.
Tate v. City of St. Paul, (1894) 56 Minn. 527, 58 N. W. 158, 45
Am. St. Rep. 501.
64oSee the discussion of this question in connection with sewer construction, supra, pp. 481-483.

q4l(1897) 70 Minn. 216, 72 N. W. 1073.
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as where there were no obstacles to be overcome which would
furnish any reason or excuse for the dangerous condition coinplained of, the city is liable for constructing and maintaining a
sidewalk on such a defective plan. Since the court found there was
such a reason in that case, the defendant was relieved of liability.
The opposite conclusion was reached in McDonald v. City of
Duluth, 42 involving a suit for damages for an injury sustained by
the plaintiff when a bridge railing gave way because it was not
properly fastened in construction. It was said that where there
are obstacles to overcome in the construction of any public
work and reasonable minds might differ as to whether the plan
adopted therefor by the municipality was the best and safest, the
decision of the municipality on the question cannot be reviewed
by the courts; but a municipality is liable for an injury caused
by an unsafe public structure, although the defect exists in the
plan adopted for its construction, if there is no reasonable necessity for having the defect.
In Klasens v. Village of Kasota0 4 in holding the defendant
liable for negligence in building a bridge guard rail too low, it
was recognized again that a municipality may be liable because of
an unnecessary defect in the plan of construction. Likewise, in
Genereau v. City of Duluth 4 4 it was held that the trial court
was right in submitting to the jury the issue of negligence arising
out of the method adopted in joining a new portion of the sidewalk to the old. The short and steep slant which caused the injury
was not called for by any grade or contour or by any necessary
construction, said the court.
What these cases seem to mean is that there is actually no
distinction, except in the frequency with which liability is imposed, between the making of plans and their execution. Instead,
the general test of reasonable care is applied here as in the case
of maintenance of streets and other public works where the
municipal corporation is not immune from liability. 04" Indeed, as
642(1904) 93 Minn. 206, 100 N. W. 1102.
643(1914) 128 Minn. 47, 150 N. W. 221.
844(1915)
131 Minn. 92, 154 N. W. 664.
645A number of decisions in other states also appear to support this
view. See, for example, Hitchins Bros. v. Mayor and Council of Frostburg,
(1887) 68 Md. 100, 6 Am. St. Rep. 422: "Any particular plan that may bc
adopted must be a reasonable one, and the manner of its execution thence
becomes, with respect to the right of the citizens a mere ministerial duty."
City of Terre Haute v. Hudnut, (1887) 112 Ind. 542, 13 N. E. 686:
"It is the duty of the municipal corporation to exercise reasonable care in
providing a plan, as well as in doing the work." White, in speaking of
the distinction between defects in plan and defects in execution of public
Fr"
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has been pointed out, this seems to be the case with respect to
the whole general distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts. Most discretionary acts, if arbitrary enough or reflecting such poor judgment as to amount to no judgment at all,

may result in liability.64
(To be Continued)
works, has said, "This distinction, unless carefully guarded and qualified,
seems repugnant to reason and justice. It has been questioned by one
authoritative court, disregarded by others, denied by still others, qualified
by another as not applicable to errors in the plan of works erected by a
city for its private profit or emolument; and it has previously received at
the hands of the same court, an application so extraordinary as not to
throw the doctrine itself into a favorable light." White, Negligence of
Municipal Corporations (1920) p. 49, sec. 32.
64GThis idea has been expressed more articulately and more completely
by Professor Jennings in his article, Tort Liability of Administrative
Officers, (1937) 21 MI~xEso A LAw REvmw 263, with reference to the
discretionary-ministerial distinction in determining the liability of officers.

